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This dissertation discusses one of the most fundamental issues of the 
epistemology of testimony, that is, how the hearer ascribes trustworthiness 
to the speaker’s testimony. For this discussion, I focus on two theories, 
namely reductionism and anti-reductionism. My discussion is based on 
justified true belief (JTB) theory of knowledge. However, in the history of 
Western epistemology, controversy exists regarding the possibility of the 
JTB theory. Without entering the controversy I accept the definition of 
Knowledge it provides.  
In Chapter One and Two, I formulate David Hume’s concept of 
testimony and then argue that the Humean account of testimony is a type of 
local reductionism. Some epistemologists contend that Hume’s concept of 
testimony is a type of global reductionism. However, I reject this view. In 
Chapter Three, I discuss Elizabeth Fricker’s concept of local reductionism 
and further argue that there is no disagreement between Hume’s concept of 
local reductionism and Fricker’s concept of local reductionism.  
In Chapter Four and Five, I analyse the anti-reductionist account of 
Tyler Burge and Jennifer Lackey. In particular, I analyse Burge’s apriori 




Finally, I argue that both reductionism and anti-reductionism 
emphasize one aspect of epistemology of testimony only. Reductionism tries 
to explain why the hearer should accept the speaker’s testimony after 
verification and anti-reductionism explains why the hearer should accept 
speaker’s testimony without any verification. Yet, both theories are 
incomplete and I contend that an alternative theory is needed for the 
epistemology of testimony. I present one alternative theory already present 
in the literature, namely Lackey’s dualism. After criticizing Lackey’s 
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“No one disputes that much, probably the greater part, of 
our knowledge is derived from what others say or reading 
what others have written.” 
  — Sir Peter Frederick Strawson (“Knowing From Words”, 1994, 23) 
 
Testimony is a vital and ubiquitous source of knowledge. We rely on 
the reports of those around us. Here is a tentative characterization of this 
source. When the speaker desires to transmit his or her knowledge and 
makes, therefore, adequate verbal utterance(s) or written statement(s), the 
receiving subject(s) (if they are sufficiently competent to understand) of 
these utterances or written statements gain the same knowledge as possessed 
by the speaker. The knowledge gained by the receiving subject(s) through 
the speaker’s utterances or written statements is testimonial knowledge, and 
the speaker’s utterances or written statements are the sources of testimonial 
knowledge or testimony. In this context I define testimonial knowledge in 
the following manner: 
A subject H acquires Testimonial Knowledge of p if and only 
if, given a sincere and competent  subject S who knows that 
p by any source of knowledge, and is willing to transmit his 
or her knowledge that p through verbal or written language 
to H, H understands S’s language and justifiably believes 
that p after receiving S’s words.  
 ix 
 
Several aspects are associated with the knowledge transmitting 
process. The aspects which are associated with this process constitute the 
subject matter of the epistemology of testimony. In this dissertation, I 
mainly examine a fundamental accounts that how the hearer ascribed the 
speaker’s trustworthiness, in the light of  reductionism and anti-reductionism, 
especially in the light of views by David Hume, Elizabeth Fricker, Tyler 
Burge, and Jennifer Lackey. I discuss their views on reductionism and anti-
reductionism in five consecutive chapters.  
I begin, in Chapter One, by discussing Hume’s concept of testimony. 
Although, it is true that Hume does not provide any well-structured theory of 
testimony, we can still construct a well-structured theory of testimony from 
his writings. To construct Hume’s concept of testimony, I begin with a 
discussion of Hume’s view on the objects of human reason because Hume’s 
concept of testimony is dependent on this view. I argue that Hume’s concept 
of testimony is not a type of global reductionism, on the basis of Hume’s 
views on the objects of human reason. In this chapter, I show that Hume 
accepted that we can correctly know about matters of fact, which are not 
present before us and are beyond our senses and memory, on the basis of 
human testimony. However, at the same time, Hume argues that the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony depends on observation and 
memories. I resolve the paradox between Hume’s claim that we can know  
about the matters of fact, which are beyond our senses and memory,  and his 
other claim that the trustworthiness of speaker’s testimony is dependent on 
observation and memory. In this context, I discuss the type of testimony the 
hearer believes or refuses to believe when he/she is not in a position to 
verify the testimony through experience and memory, and the basis for 
believing that testimony. My argument in this chapter is  that, according to 
Hume, the hearer depends on experience and memory to believe the 
speaker’s testimony. When the hearer is not in a position to verify the 
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speaker’s testimony through experience and memory, the hearer depends on 
circumstantial evidence, including gestures of the speaker, which he may 
perceive or recall through memory.
1
 If the speaker’s testimony contradicts 
the hearer’s experience and memory, then the hearer generally refuses to 
believe that testimony. Therefore, according to Hume, the trustworthiness of 
the speaker’s testimony, directly or indirectly, depends on experience and 
memory.  
In Chapter Two, I begin by discussing the manner in which the hearer 
does ascribe the trustworthiness to the speaker’s assertion. On this issue, 
epistemologists are divided into two camps, namely reductionism and anti-
reductionism. Reductionism is further divided into two camps, namely 
global reductionism and local reductionism. In this chapter, I examine 
whether or not Hume’s concept of testimony should be considered global 
reductionism. In this context, I discuss C. A. J. Coady and Paul Faulkner’s 
interpretation of Hume’s concept of testimony as a type of global 
reductionism; then, I discuss Michael Welbourne’s interpretation of Hume’s 
account of testimony. Welbourne argues that Hume did not provide any 
complete theory of testimony. He simply presented how human beings learn 
language. Finally, I argue that Hume’s concept of testimony is a type of 
local reductionism. To elaborate my point, I discuss Hume’s concept of 
                                                 
1
 “We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses 
contradict each other, when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they 
have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with 
hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There may be other 
particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any 
argument, derived from human testimony.” (Hume 2000, 85)  
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human reason, and then I argue that since Hume accepted mathematical 
knowledge which can be transmitted through testimony, Hume’s concept of 
testimony cannot be treated as global reductionism. Hence, it must be a type 
of local reductionism.  
In Chapter Three, I discuss Elizabeth Fricker’s concept of local 
reductionism and her arguments against anti -reductionism. In this context, I 
ask whether there is any conflict between Hume’s concept of testimony and 
Fricker’s concept of testimony. And my answer is that there are no conflict 
between Hume’s concept of local reductionism and Fricker’s concept of 
reductionism. 
In Chapter Four and Five, I discuss anti-reductionism in the light of 
the views of Tyler Burge and Jennifer Lackey. According to anti -
reductionism, the hearer is entitled to accept the speaker’s assertion unless 
he/she has a reason not to do it. This is the central claim of anti -
reductionism. Burge defends this claim by presenting the Acceptance 
Principle. Burge argues that a rational being generally tells the truth. 
Therefore, under normal circumstances, when a person presents something as 
true, the hearer is entitled to accept it as true, unless he/she has some strong 
reasons to doubt it. Lackey rejects Burge’s formulation of anti -reductionism 
and presents what she calls a minimal expression of ant i-reductionism.  
Finally, I conclude by arguing that both reductionism and anti -
reductionism are inadequate to explain human testimony. Therefore, we need 
an alternative theory of the epistemology of testimony. In this context, I 
discuss Lackey’s dualism as an alternative theory of the epistemology of 
testimony. Dualism is the synthesis of both reductionism and anti -
reductionism. However, I do not agree with Lackey’s formulation of dualism 
and formulate a new theory of the epistemology of testimony, which I  name 
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Contextualism. I believe my formulation is a minimal expression of the 






1.1 Testimony in the History of Western Philosophy 
In the tradition of Western epistemology, philosophers focus on 
intuition, perception, and memory as belief sources and attempt to analyze 
their structure. However, at the same time, philosophers pay extremely less 
attention to testimony despite the fact that in our daily lives, we depend as 
much on testimony as we do on intuition, perception, and memory. Since 
childhood, we learn several things from testimony – for example, we learn 
how to speak, that is, proper pronunciation and the correct word usage from 
our parents, teachers, and other people.
2
 Moreover, we learn about the type 
of relationships we should have with our family members  and relatives, and 
the behaviour we should adopt with elderly persons, our teachers, and our 
                                                 
2
 “You learn the correct use the word “cat” because your parents say “cat” when 
you are noticing a cat. If they were not sufficient for this–if, when you are noticing 
a cat, they said sometimes “dog”, sometimes “cow”, sometimes “crocodile” – you 
could never learn to speak correctly. The fact that we do learn to speak correctly is  
a testimonial to the habitual veracity of parents.” (Russell 1966, 207)  
“Think of all the things that you think you know right now – such as that the earth 
is round, or that the Nile flows through Egypt. Most of these beliefs will have been 
gained not by finding out the truth of the claim in question yourself, but by being 
told that this claim was true by others.” (Pritchard 2006, 90)  
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relatives. In addition to socio-cultural relationships, we learn about history 
(Brittan 1994, 273; Faulkner 1998, 1-2; Lackey 2006, 432; Lackey 2008, 1), 
geography, and ourselves (such as, our age, date of birth, and childhood 
events) through testimony. Thus, testimony is a crucial source of our 
knowledge. Therefore, philosophers are recently paying considerable 
attention to the epistemology of testimony, and its epistemic significance is 
being completely appreciated. In the past, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Dr. 
Tillotson, John Locke, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and Bertrand Russell  
have devoted their attention to this branch of epistemology (Fricker 1995, 
393; Coady 1992).
3
 They were not interested in providing a well-structured 
                                                 
3
 “I answer that, Christ's manner of life had to be in keeping with the end of His 
Incarnation, by reason of which He came into the world. Now He came into the 
world, first, that He might publish the truth. Thus He says Himself (Jn. 18:37): 
"For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give 
testimony to the truth." Hence it was fitting not that He should hide Himself by 
leading a solitary life, but that He should appear openly and preach in public. 
Wherefore (Lk. 4:42, 43) He says to those who wished to stay Him: "To other 
cities also I must preach the kingdom of God: for therefore am I sent." (Aquin as, 
The Summa Theologica, Part – Three, Question Fourty: OF CHRIST'S MANNER 
OF LIFE, Article One: Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a 
solitary life?, pp. 2976 – 2977) 
“The apostles were able to testify to the Resurrection even by sight , because from 
the testimony of their own eyes they saw Christ alive, whom they had known to be 
dead. But just as man comes from the hearing of faith to the beatific vision, so did 
men come to the sight of the risen Christ through the message already recei ved 
from angels.” (Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, Part – Three, Question Fifty Five: 
OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE RESURRECTION, Article Two: Whether it 
was fitting that the disciples should see Him rise again?, p. 3089)  
 3 
 
theory of testimony, but we can try to construct one based on their writing. 
In this chapter, I focus on Hume’s theory of testimony.  
 
1.2 Hume’s Concept of Testimony 
David Hume’s views were rooted in the British empiricism of Locke 
and Berkeley. Hume claimed that all objects of human reason (knowledge) 
are divided into two types, namely, relations of ideas and matters of fact. 
According to Hume: 
“All the objects of human reasoning or enquiry may 
naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of 
Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences 
of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and, in short, every 
affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively 
certain. . . . . . 
 Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human 
reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our 
evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with 
the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still 
possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is 
conceived by mind with the same facility and distinctness, as 
if ever so conformable to reality. . . . . .” (Hume 1999, 108)  
 For Hume we have only two types of knowable objects, namely, 
relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas are the subject 
matter of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic. Their propositions have two 
characteristics, they are either intuitively or demonstratively certain and they 
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do not assert the existence of any non-abstract entities. Since mathematical 
propositions do not depend on real existence, they are discoverable by the 
mere operation of thought.
4
 Matters of fact concern instead the empirical 
world, for example, a mountain, a river, or any other material object. 
Propositions concerning matters of fact are neither intuitively nor 
demonstratively certain as proposition concerning “relations of ideas,” are , 
because the denial of a proposition about a matter of fact does not imply any 
contradiction. We can easily think without any contradiction, for example, 
the proposition that the sun will not rise the next morning , although we have 
experienced daily that the sun rises. Therefore, these types of propositions or 
reasons are possibly true but not certain (Hume 1999, 108; Dicker 1998, 35 – 
36).              
According to Hume, sense experience is the only guide for knowledge 
concerning matters of fact. However, we may be able to go beyond the 
evidence of our senses and memories on the basis of the relation of cause 
and effect. For example, when an archeological survey team discovers an 
unnatural structure in a deserted place or under the ground, the team will 
conclude the existence of humans in that place. The team arrives at this 
conclusion on the basis of the relation of cause and effect. Similarly, 
according to Hume, we can gain knowledge from testimony. From testimony, 
we can infer the existence of the actual event(s) behind the testimony and 
determine whether the person who described the event(s) had directly 
observed it or had come to know from a person who has knowledge about the 
                                                 
4
 “Proposition of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 




event(s) directly or indirectly. Thus, a causal relationship exists between 
testimony and the actual event(s) it describes. Suppose, for example that an 
Egyptologist discovers an ancient inscription and on the basis of this 
inscription, he/she infers the occurrence of an event at past time. Now, the 
question is how does he/she know about an event that is beyond hi s/her 
senses and memories? The Egyptologist knows this on the basis of the 
relation of cause and effect. From the inscription, he/she infers an eye -
witness of that event, analyzes the trustworthiness of the eye-witness on the 
basis of the available information, and derives a conclusion. Hence, on the 
basis of the relation of cause and effect, we can know about matters of fact 
that do not currently exist, and are beyond our senses and memory.
5
  
According to Hume, testimony may be a source of knowledge 
although the trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony is derived from and 
                                                 
5
 “But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions from 
experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of 
fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages, yet some fact 
must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed 
in drawing these conclusions. A man, who should find in a desert country  the 
remains of pompous buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient 
times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur 
to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages 
from history; but then we must peruse the volumes, in which this instruction is 
contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till 




founded on experience and observation.
6
 We should not accept the testimony 
of a person or reports of an eye-witness blindly. Now, the question is, what 
actions should we perform when a report of an event from an eye-witness is 
received? Should we accept the reports immediately or verify them and then 
accept the reports? According to Hume, both alternatives are correct. 
Sometimes, we do accept the testimony of a person or reports of an eye -
witness without any examination or verification. However, we may 
experience the opposite. Sometimes, we hesitate to accept the testimony of a 
person or reports of an eye-witness. For the trustworthiness of these types of 
testimony, we require further evidence or ground in addition to the reports of 
                                                 
6
 “To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe that there is 
no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human 
life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye -
witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be 
founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will 
be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived 
from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, 
and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general 
maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the 
inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our 
experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident that we ought not 
to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose 
connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not 
the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to 
truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in 
a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by experience t o be qualities, 
inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human 
testimony.” (Hume 2000, 84 – 85) 
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an eye-witness. For example, when my mother says that dinner is ready to be 
served on the dining table, I accept her report because I know that she has no 
intention of misleading or deceiving me. By contrast, we are extremely 
skeptical about the reports from a stranger or someone we do not trust. In 
general, we verify their reports from other sources.  
The question is why do we verify some reports but not others? Why 
are we not skeptical about our mother’s reports but are about the stranger’s 
reports? According to Hume, we accept our mother’s reports without any 
doubt because our custom guides us to do so. We have experienced her 
trustworthiness. Thus, we can easily judge the credibility or trustworthiness 
of our mother’s testimony on the basis of custom and memories of our 
experience and observation. In the case of our mother’s reports about the 
dinner, we can infer their credibility or trustworthiness because we have 
consistently experienced it. Every night, she calls for dinner after making 
arrangements on the dining table. This custom or habit that originates on the 
basis of experience guides us to believe our mother’s  current reports.7  
According to Hume, when we accept any report or testimony without 
raising any question or without any doubt, it is not because we are apriori 
entitled to do so, but we are accustomed to do so.
8
 Instead our custom or 
                                                 
7
 “This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any 
particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or 
operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the 
understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of custom.” (Hume 
2000, 37) 
8
 “The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived 
from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but 
 8 
 
habit cannot play any role in determining the trustworthiness of a stranger’s 
or a suspicious person’s reports or testimonies. Therefore, we require 
additional ground or evidence to determine the trustworthiness of such 
reports or testimonies. We consider the circumstances, counterevidence, 
character, values of the witness, number of witnesses, gestures of the witness 
while he/she is reporting, etc. before accepting the testimony of a stranger or 
suspicious person. If we obtain sufficient grounds or assurance about the 
trustworthiness of the testimony, only then are we likely to believe the 
report, and the grounds or assurance in favor of the testimony is provided by 
experience and observation, and not by the apriori reasoning. According to 
Hume: 
“. . . . . . the evidence, derived from witnesses and human 
testimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with 
the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a 
probability, according as the conjunction between any 
particular kind of report and any kind of object has been 
found to be constant or variable. There are a number of 
circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments 
of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we 
determine all disputes, which may arise concerning them, is 
always derived from experience and observation. Where this 
experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended 
with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with 
the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as 
                                                                                                                                          




in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate 
concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite 
circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and 
when we discover superiority on any side, we incline to it; 
but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the 
force of its antagonist. 
This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may 
be derived from several different causes; from the opposition 
of contrary testimony; from the character or number of the 
witnesses; from the manner of their delivering their 
testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We 
entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the 
witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of 
a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they 
affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or 
on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are 
many other particulars of the same kind, which may 
diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from 
human testimony.” (Hume 2000, 85)  
We may summarize Hume’s arguments as follows: we may 
occasionally believe a stranger’s or suspicious person’s testimony that p, 
when we are not in a position to verify his/her testimony that p and our past 
experience and custom guide us to believe that p. However, we should 
believe the stranger’s testimony that p  only after considering various issues, 




(a) Whether the speaker’s testimony that p contradicts 
another’s testimony; 
(b) The number of people who reported that p;  
(c) The first impression of the speaker’s character ; 
(d) Whether there is any scope for the fulfillment of the 
speaker’s interest if the hearer believes the speaker’s 
testimony that p;  
(e) Whether the speaker hesitated while presenting that p; 
(f) Whether the speaker presented that p in a humorous mood.  
Let me consider the following case. Suppose that a person S travelling 
to a new city asks four persons, namely, P1, P2, P3, and P4, to recommend a 
good hotel. Suppose further that there are only three hotels, namely, O, Q, 
and R. When S asks P1 for a good hotel, P1 reports that hotel Q is 
comfortable with a reasonable price. However, when S asks the same to P2, 
P3, and P4, they decisively report that Q is a very bad hotel and R is the best 
one. In the present situation, S obviously should refuse to believe P1’s 
testimony. However, if we formulate the above example differently, then we 
would obtain a different result. Suppose, while enquiring about the hotel, 
his/her first impression about P2, P3, and P4’s character is unpleasant, they 
are hesitant while reporting, and most importantly, S discovers that each of 
them are associated with hotel R. In this si tuation according to Hume, S 
should refuse to believe P2, P3, and P4’s testimony.        
Therefore, we may conclude that, according to Hume, the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony depends on experience. Our 
custom and habit, which are constituted on the basis of experience, guide us 
to determine the trustworthiness of a known and reliable person’s testimony 
without any additional ground. By contrast, custom and habit are ineffective 
in determining the trustworthiness of an unknown and suspicious person’s 
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testimony. Hence, we require additional ground(s) for it, which, according to 
Hume, provided by experience and observation.         
However, the concern is if the event described by the speaker has 
occurred only once and the speaker is the only eye-witness or very few 
persons have witnessed it, then how can we verify the trustworthiness of the 
speaker’s testimony? Second, if an eye-witness is not present in person, then 
how could we determine the trustworthiness of the speaker’s statement?  
Hume may answer this question as follows:  
First, if an eye-witness is not present in front of the hearer but is well -
known to the hearer, then the hearer can consider the speaker’s character, 
intention, and the past experience about the speaker to determine the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony. For example, if I receive a mail 
from my friend John about some events that occurred at his place, then I 
consider his character, his intention in writing to me, and my past experience 
about him to determine the trustworthiness of his description.  
Second, when an eye-witness is present in front of the hearer and is 
well known to the hearer, then the hearer can consider the speaker’s gesture 
when delivering the assertion along with the speaker’s character, and past 
experience about the speaker to determine the trustworthiness of the 
speaker’s testimony. For example, if my friend, John, informs me about 
some events while gossiping, then I consider his gesture, his hesitation, 
when delivering his testimony along with other conditions before accepting 
his testimony. 
Third, when the eye-witness is an unknown person but is present in 
front of the hearer, then the hearer can consider the speaker’s gesture, and 
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consequences of the acceptance and denial of his/her testimony to  determine 
the trustworthiness of his/her description.  
Fourth, when an eye-witness is an unknown person and is not present 
in front of the hearer, then the hearer can consider the actual possibility of 
the event(s) described by the speaker, such as whether the speaker’s 
description contradicts our experience, along with other conditions, to accept 
the description. For example, if we receive a mail with some threatening 
content from an unknown person, we consider the mail seriously and file a 
complaint to the police. On the contrary when an assertion of an unknown 
person’s contradicts our experience, we refuse to accept the description, 
although it may be true. For example, people living in warm regions never 
experience the freezing of water in cold climate;  therefore, they might refuse 
to accept the description of the event that water freezes in cold climate 
because their experience does not support this description. Hence, they do 
not believe the description.
9
   
                                                 
9
 “The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the 
effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to 
engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was 
unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had 
constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, 




1.3 Hume’s Concept of Testimony About Miraculous Events 
I shall now consider Hume’s analysis of a case in which  the speaker 
or eye-witness is not a known person or someone present in front of us, and 
the speaker’s testimony contradicts our experience . Hume discusses this case 
in a section of his book An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , 
devoted to miracolous events. He discusses the trustworthiness of testimony 
concerning such events.  
In this context he raises an objection against the Roman Catholic view 
of a miraculous event described in the Scripture. According to the Christian 
Scripture, the night when Lord Jesus was betrayed by one of his 12 original 
apostles (Judas Iscariot), he took bread, broke it, offered to his apostles, and 
said that it was his body and the cup of wine was his blood.
10
 According to 
the Catholic theology, the description of the Lord’s Supper (the 
                                                 
10
 “11:23 For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That 
the Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed, took bread: 11:24 and 
when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is my body, which 
is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me.”  
“11:25 After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, 
This cup is the new testament in my blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in 
remembrance of me.”  
“11:26 For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord’s 
death till he come.” (The Holy Bible, Old and New Testament, King James 
Version, Duke Classics, 2012, 2567 – 2568)  
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transformation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Lord Jesus 
Christ, respectively) is not a metaphor but the description of a fact. The 
entire substance of the bread and wine transformed into Christ’s body and 
blood, respectively. However, for a finite being, it is impossible to change 
the entire substance of bread and wine into flesh and blood, respectively, 
because the substantive components of the bread and wine are different from 
those of the flesh and blood, respectively. However, such a change is not 
difficult for a powerful infinite being. Hence, the description of this 
miraculous event is not a metaphor but the description of a fact.
11
 
Some philosophers disagreed with the Roman Catholic view and 
strongly objected it. According to them, the description of the miraculous 
event (the Lord’s Supper) in the Bible contradicts our experience, and hence 
it is not acceptable. For example, Dr. John Tillotson (1630–1694) argues that 
our senses do not support the miraculous event that bread and wine 
transformed into Christ’s body and blood, respectively. In daily life, nobody 
considers bread as a human body and wine as human blood, in any cultural, 
social, or religious, framework. We cannot deny our experience and accept  
instead a religious description that contradicts it.
12
 According to Tillotson, 
                                                 
11
 “Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into matter by the power of any 
finite agent. Such a change, however, can be made by the power of an infinite 
agent, which has control over all being, because the nature of being is common to 
both forms and to both matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the 
author of being can change into whatever there is of being in the other, 
withdrawing that whereby it was distinguished from the other.” (Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa theologiae, Part III, Question 75, Article 4)  
12
 “what we see and handle and taste to be Bread is Bread, and not the Body of a 
man; and what We fee and taste to be Wine is Wine , and not Bloud: And if this 
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this view not only contradicts our experience but is full of stupidity, cruelty, 
and barbarity.
13
 Therefore, the description of the miraculous event in the 
Bible should not be accepted. 
                                                                                                                                          
evidence may not pass for sufficient without any farther proof, I do not see why 
any man, that hath confidence enough to do so, may not deny any thing to be what 
all the World sees it is, or affirm anything to be what all the World sees it is not ; 
and this without all possibility of being farther confuted . So that the business of 
Transubstantiation is not a controversie of Scripture against Scripture, or of 
Reason against Reason, but of downright Impudence against the plain meaning of 
Scripture, and all the Sense and Reason of Mankind. (Spellings are unchanged).” 
(Tillotson 1684, 2) 
“I shall press the business a little farther, supposing the scripture to be a divine 
revelation, and that these words (this is my body) if they be in scripture, must 
necessarily be taken in the strict and literal sense; I ask now, what greater evidence 
any man has that these words (this is my body) are in the bible, than every man has 
that the bread is not changed in the sacrament? Nay no man has so much; for we 
have only the evidence of one sense that these words are in the bibl e, but that the 
bread is not changed we have the concurring testimony of several of our senses. In 
a word, if this be once admitted that the senses of all men are deceived in one of 
the most plain sensible matters that can be, there is no certain means lef t either to 
convey or prove a divine revelation to men; nor is there any way to confute the 
grossest impostures in the world: for if the clear evidence of all men's senses be 
not sufficient for this purpose, let any man, if he can, find a better and more 
convincing argument.” (Tillotson 1843, 264) 
13
 “The infinite scandal of this doctrine to the Christian Religion. And that upon 
these four accounts. 1. Of the stupidity of this doctrine. 2. The real barbarousness 




1.4 Arguments Against Miraculous Events 
Following Tillotson, Hume also rejects the testimony of the real 
transformation of bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood, respectively  
by providing two arguments. First, he points out that the description of the 
miraculous event is a violation of the laws of nature and universal 
experience. Second, he expresses his suspicion toward the apostles who 
claimed that they eye-witnessed to that miraculous event. I will discuss now 
both arguments one by one.       
The first argument against the testimony concerning the miraculous 
event is as follows: 
According to the Christian religious Scripture, the trustworthiness of 
the description of the miraculous event is founded on the testimony of 
apostles who eye-witnessed it. However, in daily life, our senses do not 
support the description of such miraculous events. In this context, Hume 
differentiates between two types of evidence: the evidence for truth provided 
by our senses and the evidence for truth provided by the Christian religion. 
According to him, these two types of evidence have qualitative differences. 
The evidence of the senses is stronger than that of the Christian religion. 
Moreover, if weak evidence contradicts strong evidence, then the strong 
evidence is accepted because the weak evidence cannot destroy the strong 
                                                                                                                                          
doctrine. 3. Of the cruel and bloudy consequences of it. 4. Of the danger of 






 The description of the real occurrence of the miraculous event, 
that is, the real transformation of the bread and wine into Christ’s body and 
blood, respectively, directly contradicts our senses; therefore, the description 
of the miraculous event founded on the Christian Scripture should not be 
accepted, because it violates the laws of nature. In this context, Hume makes 
a distinction between natural and miraculous events. When an event occurs 
in the normal course of nature, then the event is considered natural. By 
contrast, when an event does not occur in the normal course of nature and is 
not observed in any age or country, then the event is considered miraculous. 
For example, death of a human being occurs in the normal course of nature. 
Thus, the death of a human being is a normal event. However, in the normal 
course of nature bread and wine never transform into body and blood, 
respectively, and nobody at any age or country has ever observed such a 
transformation. Hence, bread and wine transforming into Christ’s body and 
blood, respectively is not a normal event; it is a miraculous event  which, 
according to the Scripture, at the time of its occurrence, had some eye-
witnesses. However, Hume refuses to acknowledge it, because for him the 
description of the real occurrence of this miraculous event is  a violation of 
                                                 
14
 “But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the 
doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly 
contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, 
though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry 
not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as external 
evidences, and are not brought home to every one’s breast, by the immediate 
operation of the Holy Spirit.” (Hume 2000, 83)  
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the laws of nature. Thus, we cannot accept a testimony about a miraculous 
event unless the falsehood of the testimony is more miraculous.
15
  
The second argument against testimony concerning the miraculous 
event is as follows: 
 Human beings generally tend to accept some testimonies and reject 
others. How do we react when a stranger or even a well-known person 
describes an event that we have not experienced? We compare those events 
with events known to us, enquire whether they resemble our experience, and 
consider opposite evidence. After considering all these factors, if we find a 
high degree of possibility of the event, then we believe the description. 
However, if a stranger or even a well-known person describes any unusual 
event that is absurd, miraculous, and anomalous with respect to our 
experience, we reject the description immediately. A person, having deep 
faith in his/her religion may claim to observe something extraordinary or 
                                                 
15
 “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of 
such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it 
endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of 
arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of 
force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.” When anyone tells me, that he 
saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be 
more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the 
fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle 
against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce 
my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his 
testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not 
till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.” (Hume 2000, 87)  
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miraculous to substantiate the greatness of the religion or promote its 
holiness and secret powers. For example, the apostles of the Christian 
religion claimed that they eye-witnessed the miraculous event in which bread 
and wine transformed into Lord Christ’s body and blood,  respectively.16 
However, according to Hume, this type of description is not acceptable. 
Although we love this wonderful description, we should not consider it true, 
because people living in those ancient times were uncivilized, ignorant, and 
barbarous. Therefore, we should not accept their descriptions.
17
  
Hume provides another strong reason that diminishes the 
trustworthiness of those who claimed that they eye-witnessed that 
miraculous event. According to Hume, to promote the secret power, 
holiness, or divinity of the religious system, proponents and disciples of the 
                                                 
16
 “A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: he 
may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions 
in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion 
has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates o n him more 
powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self -
interest with equal force.” (Hume 2000, 89)  
17
 “. . . . .  all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly 
to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever 
given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them 
from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable 
sanction and authority, which always attend received opinions.” (Hume 2000, 90)  
“The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. 
None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and 
authority to contradict and beat down the delusion.” (Hume 2000, 91)  
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religious systems disseminated descriptions of miraculous events. 
Simultaneously, disciples of another particular religious system disseminated 
some other miraculous description in their religious system as true and real, 
and contradicted all others miraculous descriptions admitted in the rival 
religion. For example, disciples of the Christian religion rejected the 
descriptions of other religions, such as those of Muslims, Parsis, and Hindus, 
and vice versa. In the process of destroying a rival system, disciples of every 
religious system refuse to provide credit to miraculous events described in 
other religions. In this process, the credibility of a miraculous event in each 
religious system is rejected. Let us suppose that there are only five religions 
globally, such as R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5. Disciples of R1 refuse to admit or 
give any credit to a miraculous event described by the others’ religions (R2, 
R3, R4, and R5) and reject the description. Similarly, disciples of the R2, 
R3, R4, and R5 would deny giving any credit to a miraculous event 
described in the R1 and reject the description. The miraculous event 
described in each religion is rejected by others religions. Hence, we are not 
justified in believing the description of the miraculous event.
18
 We can 
depict the acceptance and rejection of miraculous events by following table:  
R1 accepts miraculous event M1  R2, R3, R4, and R5 reject M1 
R2 accepts miraculous event M2 R1, R3, R4, and R5 reject M2 
R3 accepts miraculous event M3 R1, R2, R4, and R5 reject M3 
R4 accepts miraculous event M4 R1, R2, R3, and R5 reject M4 
                                                 
18
 “In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on 
which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions 
are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether 
weak or strong, as opposite to each other.” (Hume 2000, 91) 
 21 
 
R5 accepts miraculous event M5 R1, R2, R3, and R4 reject M5 
 
Here, each of the miraculous events accepted by each religion, that is, 
M1 to M5, is rejected by disciples of the other religions. Hence, these 
miraculous events should not be accepted. As a conclusion, according to 
Hume, even if the eye-witness or the speaker is well-known to us or is 
present before us, the trustworthiness of the testimony depends on our 






2.1 A Reductionist Theory of Testimony 
In the previous chapter, I discussed Hume’s concept of testimony in 
detail. In the present chapter, I focus on some fundamental issues of the 
epistemology of testimony, such as how does the hearer ascribes 
trustworthiness to the speaker, whether the hearer has an appropriate  reason 
to ascribe the trustworthiness to the speaker, how can we justify ourselves to 
trust in what is reported by others, and whether we should have any 
justification for forming our beliefs on the basis of the speaker’s assertion. 
These questions are crucial for the epistemology of testimony. (Lackey 2008, 
141; Kusch 2002, 29; Faulkner 1998, 2)  
Before entering the discussion regarding the manner in which the 
hearer ascribes trustworthiness to the speaker, I would like to discuss what 
epistemologists mean by the word “trustworthiness”. By the word 
“trustworthiness”, they mean a type of virtue or property of the speaker. To 
ascribe trustworthiness to a speaker is to consider him/her  as accountable, 
acceptable, or competent with respect to the content of his/her assertion. If a 
speaker lacks this virtue or property, then the hearer should not consider 
him/her as competent with respect to the content of his/her assertion. 
Therefore, trustworthiness is a virtue or property of the speaker which 
renders the speaker competent or acceptable to the hearer with respect to the 
content of speaker’s assertion , and knowledge of this virtue or lack of this 
virtue allows the hearer to determine the competency or acceptability of the 
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speaker in respect to his/her assertion.  We can formulate it in the following 
way (where V is trustworthiness): 
If a hearer discovers that the speaker S has V in respect to 
the content of his/her assertion A, then the hearer considers 
the speaker as competent or acceptable in respect to the 
content of his/her assertion A. 
If a hearer discover that the speaker S does not possess the V 
with respect to the content of his/her assertion A, then the 
hearer considers the speaker as incompetent or unacceptable 
with respect to the content of his/her assertion A. 
In the epistemology of testimony, epistemologists have been using the 
word “trustworthiness”, “credibility”, or “reliability” to refer to this virtue 
or property of the speaker. In this dissertation, I will also use them to refer 
to the same virtue or property of the speaker. In the context of Fricker’s 
concept of reductionism, I will discuss the nature of trustworthiness in 
detail.  
There is no single and simple way exists to resolve the fundamental 
problems of the epistemology of testimony, namely, how the hearer does 
ascribes trustworthiness to the speakers. Consequently, epistemologists are 
not unanimous on this issue. As a result, two different theories are available; 
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 “Even if an expression of thought qualifies as testimony and the resulting belief 




2.2 Reductionism and Anti-reductionism 
According to some epistemologists, we should believe testimony only 
if the testimony is founded on some empirical evidence (Kusch 2002, 30). If 
we are able to find any empirical evidence or ground for the acceptance of 
testimony (i.e., if our present experience or the memories of the past 
experience provide any ground to believe the testimony), only then can we 
reasonably believe the testimony. Therefore, according to this view, reason 
or justification of the testimony derives from the empirical evidence. In the 
history of the epistemology of testimony, this account is known as a 
“reductive” account of the epistemology of testimony.20  
                                                                                                                                          
question of how precisely such a belief successfully counts as justified belief or an 
instance of knowledge. Indeed, this is the question at the center of the 
epistemology of testimony, and the current philosophical literature contains two 
central options for answering it: non-reductionism and reductionism.” (Lackey and 
Sosa 2006, 4) 
20
 “. . . . . . there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even 
necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and 
the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one 
may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute 
about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of 
this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of 
human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses.” 
(Hume 2000, 84) 
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However, some epistemologists refuse to join this reductionist camp. 
According to them, testimony is a basic source of justification, in the same 
manner as sense experience, memory, and inference are. Thus, we are 
entitled to believe every testimony as a true statement , unless we have strong 
reason for not believing. If there are any relevant defeaters of the speaker’s 
testimony, only then the hearer is entitled to refuse to accept the speaker’s 
testimony. However, I must say, only the presence of a defeater on its own is 
not be sufficient reason to reject any testimony; because sometimes a 
defeater can be defeated by another defeater. For example, suppose my 
history teacher,
21
 while teaching us about the history of the ancient Egyptian 
civilization, stated that Tutankhamen’s parents were Akhenaten and his 
(Akhenaten’s) sister, who was also his wife. According to anti-reductionism, 
I must accept my teacher’s testimony, unless I have a strong reason for not 
to believe my teacher’s assertion. Furthermore, suppose that, after returning 
home, I read my history book and find that the authentic author of the book 
stated that, according to Egyptologists, Tutankhamen’s parents were not 
identified. Now, given the present circumstances, what should I do? Should I 
accept or refuse my teacher’s testimony considering that I have a relevant 
defeater of his testimony? According to anti-reductionism, I am not entitled 
to accept my teacher’s testimony because I have  a strong reason for not to 
believe his testimony. However, suppose that I further extend my enquiry 
and locate recent research findings that are based on DNA tests and discover 
that Tutankhamen’s parents were Akhenaten (mummy KV55) and his sister 
and wife (mummy KV35YL). After knowing about these findings, I am 
entitled to believe my teacher’s testimony because this new information 
about the Tutankhamen’s parents defeated the defeater of my teacher’s 
                                                 
21
 He/she is well informed  about the recent research on Tutankhamen’s parents.  
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testimony that “Tutankhamen’s parents were Akhenaten and his 
(Akhenaten’s) sister and wife.” Therefore, according to the anti -
reductionism, a defeater does not provide sufficient reason to reject  a 
testimony. If the “defeater” is considered as “undefeated -defeater,” then and 
only then can we refuse to accept any speaker’s testimony. In the history of 




Thus, according to the epistemology, the justification of testimony is 
a fundamental and controversial issue and epistemologists are not unanimous 
on this issue. There is much disagreement and many counter arguments on 
this matter. Hence, there is no strong and universally accepted theory to 
resolve this problem. Consequently, epistemologists consider this issue as a 
weak point of the epistemology of testimony, which is vulnerable to 
criticism, and call it vulnerability problem of the epistemology of testimony. 
Within this chapter and next chapter, I shall discuss how reductive theorists 
address this problem, especially on the light of David Hume and Elizabeth 
Fricker.  
                                                 
22
 “The primary default position, the Acceptance Principle, is not an empirical 
principle. The general form of justification associated with the principle is: A 
person is a priori entitled to accept a proposition that is presented as true and that 
is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so, because it is 
prima facie preserved (received) from a rational source, or resource for reason; 
reliance on rational sources- or resources for reason-is, other things equal, 
necessary to the function of reason.  The justificational force of the entitlement 
described by this justification is not constituted or enhanced by sense experiences 




Before initiating the discussion of Hume’s and Fricker’s reductive 
theory of testimony in detail, I would like to briefly introduce the reductive 
theory of testimony. In everyday life, we consider knowledge also beliefs 
that are not originated by the sense experience or memory, and not even 
inference which based on experience or memory. Sometimes knowledge 
originates from what is said or written by someone else. For example, as a 
common man, if I wanted to know the ancient history of Egypt, then neither 
my sense experience nor my memories of the past knowledge could help me. 
Even inference, which is dependent upon my sense experience and 
memories, could not help me in this regard. Therefore, if I want to know the 
ancient history of Egypt, I must read the books which are written on it by an 
Egyptologist or someone who got the description from an Egyptologist. As a 
non-expert about the history of Egypt, I would not know about the ancient 
history of Egypt through perceptions, memories, or any scientific analysis. 
Suppose that some scientists, who have great expertise on the ancient history 
of Egypt through some scientific method, can come to the conclusion that 
Akhenaten (mummy KV55) and his sister and wife (mummy KV35YL) were 
Tutankhamen’s parents.23 As a common person, I do not have such expertise 
on this subject; therefore, I do not have an option other than accepting what 
                                                 
23
 “Genetic fingerprinting allowed the construction of a five -generation pedigree of 
Tutankhamun’s immediate lineage. The KV55 mummy and KV35YL were 
identified as the parents of Tutankhamun.” (Hawass, Gad, Ismail, Khairat, Fathalla, 
Hasan, Ahmed, Elleithy, Ball, Gaballah, Wasef, Fateen, Amer, Gostner, Selim, 
Zink, Pusch: 2010, 638).  
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the scientists have stated about Tutankhamen’s family. Hence, we must 
acknowledge the knowledge providing capacity of testimony.  
However, epistemologists have unanimously accepted that sometimes 
testimony misleads us, as perception sometimes misleads us.
24
 For example, 
if any religious priest, only on the basis of his faith and religious myth, 
without applying any scientific method, considers a particular pyramid as the 
oldest pyramid in the world ever discovered, then the tes timony of the priest 
about the oldest pyramid is not credible. It may mislead us; therefore, we are 
unable to gain any knowledge from what the priest has stated. Hence, not 
every statement or report of another person should be considered as a 
knowledge provider. Thus, under these circumstances, obviously one 
question arises in our mind regarding what makes any testimony acceptable 
or justified, since, we cannot claim that we know something from the 
testimony, unless we have any justification in its favor. We can claim that 
we know that P, on the basis of the statement T, only if we are justified in 
doing so. Therefore, the fundamental question in the epistemology of 
testimony is what counts as justification of the testimonial belief?  
Again, epistemologists are not unanimous on this issue. Some 
epistemologists (reductionists) have tried to explain the justification for 
believing a testimony on the basis of non-testimonial belief. According to 
reductionists, we accept a testimony not only because we do not have a 
defeater of the testimony as anti-reductionists (I will discuss this theory in 
Chapter Four and Five) claim, but also because we have sufficient positive 
                                                 
24
 “Sometimes, of course, the testimony we receive is false or misleading.” 
(Pritchard 2006, 90) 
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reasons or grounds for accepting the testimony. However, these grounds are 
not based on testimony because if we accept testimony as a justifiable basis 
of testimony, then the theory will be faced with the fallacy of circularity. 
Therefore, according to the reductionists, these reasons or grounds are 
provided by inductive inference, sense experience, and memories. Present 
sense experience and memories of past experience help us to distinguish 
between reliable and unreliable speakers on the basis of contexts, content of 
the testimony, and types of testimony. Thus, according to reductionism, we 
believe a certain testimony T because we have a strong and relevant positive 
reason R (not only the absence of a defeater, as anti -reductionists would 
claim) in favor of the testimony T, and the reason R was derived from joint 
exercise of the sense experience, memory, and inductive inference. Because 
we have the justification for believing sense experience, memory, and 
inference and testimony T is supported by the sense experience, memories, 
and inference then we are justified in believing that T. Therefore, the 
justification of testimony is transmitted from the non-testimonial source of 
knowledge.
25
 In this way, reductionists reduce the justification of the 
testimony to the justification of sense experience, memory, and inductive 
inference (Lackey and Sosa 2006, 5).  
However, critics may object that sometimes we believe someone’s 
testimony without any empirical verification. For example, when my mother 
said that she made my special noodles dish for breakfast, I immediately 
believed her without any verification. To answer the critic’s objection, 
                                                 
25
 “. . . . .  conformity to the non-testimonially-known reality is the reason for our 
trust in testimony, then our trust in testimony derives its justification from non -
testimonial evidence.” (Shogenji 2006, 332) 
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reductionists argue that if we analyzed all the testimony, then we would find 
a basis for believing that testimony, which was derived from experience. 
When my mother says that she has prepared my favorite chicken dish for 
dinner, I immediately believe her without any doubt because I have strong 
evidence on the basis of past experience that she has never deceived me and 
also because she has no intention to deceive me in this regard. Hence, the 
hearer does not need any additional empirical evidence in favor of every 
instance of assertion. It is true that sometimes we believe a speaker’s 
assertion without questioning the speaker’s trustworthiness. However, if we 
deeply analyzed the reason behind my acceptance of my mother’s assertion 
without any doubt, then we would find that the reason is nothing more than 
memories of my prior experience about her trustworthiness. I know that she 
has never deceived me, especially with respect to my food. This memory of 
my past experience guides me to accept my mother’s assertion without any 
doubt. Therefore, according to reductionism, the justification of the 
testimonial belief is ultimately derived from empirical evidence.   
 
2.4 Global and Local Reductionism 
However, in the reductionist theory of test imony, the question is, 
what exactly is reduced in the reductionist’s theory of testimony? Opinions 
are divided in this matter. According to some reductionists, “. . . . . 
justification of testimony as a source of belief reduces to the justification of 
the sense perception, memory, and inductive inference. In particular, global 
reductionists maintain that in order to justifiedly accept a speaker’s report, 
a hearer must have non-testimonially based positive reason for believing 
that testimony is generally reliable.” (Lackey 2008, 145; Lackey and Sosa 
2006, 5)  
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This type of approach explains the justification of testimonial beliefs 
in a “wholesale manner”. According to this formulation of reductionism, “a 
particular belief would then justified simply in the virtue of being an 
instance of more general type of knowledge, whose overall validity and 
reliability have already been established .” (Gelfert 2014, 104) Therefore, 
according to this view, the epistemic status of one’s testimony-based belief 
can always be reduced to the epistemic status of one’s non-testimony-based 
belief. Pritchard formulates this view of reductionism as follows: 
“For all of one’s TBBs (testimony-based beliefs), if one’s 
TBB is justified, then one is able to offer sufficient non-
testimonial grounds in support of that TBB.” (Pritchard 
2004, 328)  
In the history of epistemology of testimony, this theory is known as 
global reductionism.   
However, the problem is that if we accept global reductionism, then 
we are not able explain our intellectual development in the initial stage. The 
intellectual development of children depends to a large extent on their 
parents’ testimony, although, at that stage, they are not able to verify it. 
Unless we accept the fact that sometimes we accept testimony without  any 
sufficient independent basis for doing so, we are unable to explain our 
intellectual development (Pritchard 2004, 331; 2006, 90). Elizabeth Fricker 
called this stage the “simple trust” stage. I will discuss it in the context of 
Fricker’s concept of reductionism (Fricker 2006, 225–226).  
Moreover, sometimes, also in the non-developmental stage, we are 
forced to accept some testimony without any sufficient independent basis for 
doing so. If we refuse to believe any testimony without any empirical 
evidence, then we would not be able to survive in the world because our 
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every-day life depends to a large extent on testimonies in support of which 
we are unable to offer sufficient independent grounds. For example, suppose 
there is only one spaceship in the entire world and astronauts aboard the 
spaceship inform their head-quarters that the data-transmitting machine is 
not functioning properly, and hence they cannot send any picture or 
electronic data from the spaceship; suppose further that they observe 
abnormalities in the north pole that is likely to create a deadly storm in 
northern Europe, particularly, the coastal areas of the Netherlands. After 
receiving this information, what should the officers of the space station do? 
Should they believe it and take the necessary action to save the people of the 
coastal areas or ignore it, given that they cannot check the information? In 
my opinion, they should believe the astronauts’ information and take the 
necessary precautions. Reductionists may respond that the officers of the 
space station had uniform and consistent prior experience about the 
astronauts’ reliability or trustworthiness, and that their memories of those 
experiences help them to infer the reliability of the astronauts’ present 
information. Therefore, in this case, they could accept the astronauts’ 
testimony without requiring any additional empirical evidence.  
Let me then slightly revise my counterexample and show that 
sometimes we are forced to accept information from others without verifying 
it and without any empirical grounds or basis for doing so. For example, 
suppose that there are only two spaceships in the entire world. One is from 
the Netherlands and the other is from an enemy country of the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, suppose that officers of the Netherlands space station are not 
able to make contact with their spaceship; at the same time, officers of the 
enemy space station inform officials of the Netherlands space station that 
they observed abnormalities in the North Pole that may create a deadly storm 
in northern Europe, especially the coastal areas of the Netherlands, within 12 
hours. Now, the question is what should the officers of the Netherlands 
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space station do after receiving that information? In this case, the 
information comes from persons that they do not consider reliable because 
they are from an enemy country. The officers of the Netherlands space 
station do not have any prior experience with the reliability of these 
informers. Hence, they would not able to infer their informers’ reliab ility 
from the joint exercise of sense experience, memory, and inductive 
inference. Given the present circumstances, what should they do? Should 
they believe the information of the enemy space station and take the 
necessary action to save the peoples of the coastal areas or ignore it? In my 
opinion they should accept the information and take the necessary action to 
rescue the people of the coastal region, even though they are unable to 
empirically verify the informant’s trustworthiness.  
Not only that, sometimes we also accept reported information without 
verifying or examining any correlation or conjunction between the report and 
the information provided in the report. We do this even though the data 
presented in the report are available to us, which they were not in the 
previous case. For example, suppose that I am suffering from a stomach 
disease and my physician advises me to undergo an endoscopy and I agree to 
do so. Furthermore, suppose that in the endoscopy report, the pathologist 
states that I have a stomach ulcer. Now, in this given situation I have all the 
data using which the pathologist concludes that I have a stomach ulcer. 
However, as a layperson, I do not have the expertise necessary to evaluate 
the correlation between my medical report and the medical facts. Therefore, 
I have no other choice but to accept the pathologist’s report regarding my 
health (the medical facts).     
   After identifying these types of problems, some reductionists 
have revised their account as follows: “ we must necessarily rely on some 
conceptual, linguistic and other background knowledge  (Gelfert 2014, 110),” 
 34 
 
on the basis of people’s testimonies which are not supported by the 
sufficient independent evidence. For example, as children, we accept much 
testimony without any sufficient independent evidence or basis. But, in order 
to reduce the justification of testimonial beliefs to any non-testimonial 
source of evidence, we must proceed on a case-by-case basis. Reductionists 
who endorse this view are called “local reductionists.”  According to them,  
“. . . . the justification of each particular report or instance 
of testimony reduces to the justification of instances of sense 
perception, memory, and inductive inference. Specifically, 
local reductionists claim that in order to justifiedly accept 
speaker’s testimony, a hearer must have non-testimonially 
based positive reason for accepting the particular report in 
question.” (Lackey 2008, 148; Lackey and Sosa 2006, 5)  
Thus, according to local reductionism, in order to justifiably accept 
one’s testimony, we must proceed on a case-by-case basis. We occasionally 
accept testimonies without any sufficient independent evidence or ground. 
We do so during the initial stage of our intellectual development and 
childhood. Generally, though, in order to justifiably accept a testimony, a 
hearer must have sufficient independent positive reason for accepting the 
testimony. Pritchard formulated local reductionism as follows: 
“For all of one’s TBBs (testimony-based beliefs) gained in 
the non-developmental stage, if one’s TBB is justified, then 
one is able to offer sufficient independent grounds in support 
of that TBB.” (Pritchard 2004, 332)  
According to Pritchard, a subject S, who is at a non-developmental 
stage, can justifiably hold a testimony-based belief if he/she is able to offer 
sufficient independent ground in support of his/her belief. On the contrary, if 
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a subject S is in the initial stage of intellectual development and childhood, 
then he/she can accept testimony without any sufficient independent grounds 
in favor of the testimony-based belief. However, I believe that this 
formulation of local reductionism is not sufficient for all testimony-based 
beliefs of the non-development stage. This formulation can exclude the 
testimony-based beliefs which we gained in an initial stage of intellectual 
and during childhood, but it could not exclude some exceptional case where 
we accept a testimony-based belief without any sufficient independent 
grounds (e.g., in my examples of the an enemy space station, and of the 
pathology report). Therefore, to exclude the testimony-based beliefs of 
intellectual developmental stage and some exceptional cases, I think that 
Pritchard’s version of local reductionism should be revised in the following 
way: 
For all of one’s TBBs (testimony-based beliefs) gained in 
non-exceptional cases and at a non-developmental stage, if 
one’s TBB is justified, then one is able to offer sufficient 
independent grounds in support of that TBB. 
After my brief discussion of global and local reductionism, one must 
conclude that the opinions of reductionists are divided on the issue of 
justifiably accepted testimony. However, both global and local reductionis ts 
agree that in order to justify in believing any testimony, following condition 
must be satisfied: 
 For every speaker S, and hearer H, H is justified in 
believing that p on the basis of S’s testimony that p, only if, 
in addition to absence of undefeated defeaters, H has 
positive reason in favor of p and that positive reason is not 
based on any testimony.  
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Both global and local reductionists accept that condition, that is, the 
non-testimonial-based positive reason.  However, the difference between 
global and local reductionism is as follows:  
According to global reductionism, for every speaker S, and hearer H, 
H is justified in believing that p on the basis of S’s testimony that p, when H 
must have some positive reasons in favor of S’s testimony that p, in addition 
to the absence of undefeated defeaters.  On the contrary, according to local 
reductionism, For every speaker S, and hearer H, who is at a non-
developmental stage or is not an exceptional case, H is justified in believing 
that p on the basis of S’s testimony that p, when H must have positive reason 
in favor of S’s testimony that p, in addition to the absence of undefeated 
defeaters.     
 
 
2.5 Hume’s Reductionist Theory of Testimony  
In the previous section, I discussed the reductionist theory of 
testimony. In the present section, I shall focus on Hume’s version of it. 
According to Hume, when we receive any report or testimony, we should not 
accept it immediately; we try to find additional grounds or reasons for 
accepting it. If we are able to find out any additional grounds or reasons in 
favor of the report, only then we can justifiably accept what others report. 
For example, suppose that Mr. John is a manager of a multinational company 
and one of his colleagues informs him of the corruption within his office. 
What should Mr. John do? Should he accept the report without any 
investigation or should he accept it after investigation? I believe that Mr. 
John should accept the report after investigation. Hence, the trustworthiness 
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of any report depends on empirical evidence. We are not entitled to 
justifiably accept any testimony unless we have a positive reason in favor of 
the testimony, and this positive reason must be provided by experience, not 
by any apriori reasoning. Here is what Hume says: 
“It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any 
argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than 
our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of 
the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It 
being a general maxim, that no objects have any 
discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, 
which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely 
on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; 
it is evident that we ought not to make an exception to this 
maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with 
any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other.” 
(Hume 2000, 84) 
“The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and 
historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we 
perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because 
we are accustomed to find a conformity between them.” 
(Hume 2000, 85 – 86) 
“To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may 
observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, 
more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that 
which is derived from the testimony of men and the reports 
of eye-witnesses and spectators. . . . . . It will be sufficient 
to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is 
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derived from no other principle than our observation of the 
veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of 
facts to reports of witnesses.” (Hume 2000, 84)  
According to Hume, the justification for testimonial beliefs is 
dependent on non-testimonial evidence.
26
 Now, the question is what type of 
reductionism is it? Is it a global or a local reductionist theory? Scholars have 
different view on this issue. I present first Coady’s interpretation, according 
to which Hume endorses global reductionism and he criticizes Hume on this 
ground. Next, I present Faulkner’s version of Hume’s global reductionism. 
Finally, I discuss Welbourne’s interpretation . I conclude this section with 
my own reading of Hume’s account of testimony.  
Coady finds evidence for his interpretation of Hume as a global 
reductionist on passages such as the following:  
“. . . the reason why we place any credit in witnesses and 
historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we 
perceive a priori, between testimony and the reality, but 
because we are accustomed to find a conformity between 
them.” (Hume 1999, 172)  
                                                 
26
 “Essentially his theory constitutes a reduction of testimony as a form of evidence 
or support to the status of a species (one might almost say, a mutation) of inductive 
inference. And, again, in so far as inductive inference is reduc e by Hume to a 
species of observation and consequences attendant upon observation, then in a like 
fashion testimony meets the same fate.” (Coady 1992, 79; Coady 1973, 149)  
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 “It being a general maxim, that no objects have any 
discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, 
which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely 
on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; 
it is evident that we ought not to make an exception to this 
maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with 
any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. 
Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not 
men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of 
probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a 
falsehood: were not these, I say, discovered by experience to 
be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never 
repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man 
delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner 
of authority with us.” (Hume 2000, 85; Coady 1992, 97)  
According to Coady, these passages show that since Hume states 
reliability depends upon observation and experience, he must be a global 
reductionist.
27
 As global reductionists have claimed, “in order to justifiably 
accept a speaker’s report, a hearer must have non -testimonial-based positive 
reasons for believing that the testimony is generally reliable  (Lackey 2006, 
5).”  
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 “Hume’s argument is not fully explicit here but he seems to be claiming that 
since we sometimes discover by observation and experience that some testimony is 
unreliable (i.e. ‘A man delirious or noted for falsehood or villainy has no manner 
of authority with us’) then we must discover the general reliability of testimony by 
the same method.” (Coady 1992, 97)  
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However, Coady rejects global reductionism on two grounds:  
First, he argues that “. . . observation can sometimes uncover false 
testimony does nothing towards showing that the general reliability of 
testimony depends upon observation in the way RT (Coady uses the 
abbreviation RT to refer Reductionist Thesis {Coady 1992, 80}) requires 
(Coady 1992, 97).” If we accept reductionism in the epistemology of 
testimony on the basis of the principle according to which we sometimes 
discover by observation and experience that some testimony is unreliable, 
then Hume must accept reductionism in the epistemology of memory because 
sometimes we discover that our memories are false as they do not adequately 
correspond with our present observation.
28
 Therefore, if we accept the 
Humean principle of reductionism, then we need empirical evidence also in 
order to justify our memories. However, we do not justify our memories 
through observation; hence, the Humean principle of reductionism should be 
rejected. 
Second, Coady contends that Hume’s account involves vicious 
circularity. To understand why, let me summarize Hume’s account one more 
time. According to Hume, every hearer H and speaker S, H is justified in 
believing that p on the basis of S’s testimony that p, when H is able to verify 
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 “Sometimes an individual discovers that his memories are false because they do 
not adequately consort with his present perceptual experience. He may think he 
recalls a large flowering gum tree in a certain familiar park at a certai n spot but 
when he goes there to admire it, there is no sign of its ever having been there, 
though he soon comes across it in a nearby golf course which he recall frequenting. 
Here individual observation (plus or including a little inference) shows memory to 
be fallacious.” (Coady 1992, 98)  
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S’s testimony that p through observation. However, when H is unable to 
verify it through observation or when S’s trustworthiness is well established 
through past experience, then S’s testimony that p should be based on the 
causal principle and laws of nature. Therefore, when a testimony presents a 
miraculous event, we should reject that testimony immediately because we 
are unable to verify such testimony through observation and because of its 
contradicted our uniform experience and laws of nature.    
Coady remarks that uniform experience and the laws of nature, which 
are the basis of the testimony when the hearer does not verify or is unable to 
verify before believing that testimony, are dependent on testimonial beliefs . 
We can consider an observation or experience of an object as a uniform 
observation or experience only if it is observed irrespective of age or 
country.  However, to know that the object is observed at any age or in any 
country, we must to depend on the testimony (i.e., the reports of past 
observation and the reports of other places) because it is impossible for a 
person to observe any event that occurred in a remote place and in the past. 
Therefore, according to Coady, for the trustworthiness of the testimony, 
Hume depends on uniform observation, and for the knowledge of uniform 
observation he depends on the testimony.  
Coady’s argument is as follows:  
“Evidently, then, RT (Reductionist Thesis) as actually 
argued by Hume is involved in vicious circularity, since the 
experience upon which our reliance upon testimony as a 
form of evidence is supposed to rest is itself reliant upon 
testimony which cannot be reduced in the same way.” 
(Coady 1992, 81)             
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According to Coady, this is true for not only the testimony of 
miraculous or past events, but also true for the present earthly event s. For 
example, in the Treatise of Human Nature Hume says that:  
“I receive a letter, which upon opening it I perceive by the 
hand-writing and subscription to have come from a friend, 
who says he is two hundred leagues distant. 'T is evident I 
can never account for this phenomenon, conformable to my 
experience in other instances, without spreading out in my 
mind the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing 
the effects and continued existence of posts and ferries, 
according to my memory and observation.” (Hume 1965, 
Book–I, Part–IV, Sec.–II, 196)  
Elsewhere, Hume says: 
“Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as 
something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, 
even when it is no longer present to my perception.” (Hume 
1965, Book–I, Part–IV, Sec.–II, 197) 
According to Coady, when Hume uses the term ‘my’ observation, he 
is not entitled to do so because it is very difficult to personally observe the 
complete journey of even one letter. Therefore, his belief about the postal 
system depends on a complicated web of testimony and inference. Hence, 
according to Coady, for the trustworthiness of testimony, Hume depends on 
uniformity of observation. On the other hand, to know uniformity of 
observation, we are highly dependent on testimony. Therefore, Hume’s 
scheme of reductionism involves a vicious circularity. (Coady 1992, 80 – 81) 
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Paul Faulkner (1998) criticizes Coady’s interpretation of Hume’s 
account of testimony that the hearer derives the credibility of the speaker’s 
testimony from the memories of past experience when he/she is not in a 
position to verify it (in the case of an unknown passer-by’s testimony) or not 
eager to verify it (in the case of a well-known person’s testimony).  
However, according to Faulkner, Coady does not correct ly interpret 
Hume. There are other ways of answering the question of how the hearer 
gains credibility of the speaker’s testimony from his/her past observations. 
One may interpret Hume differently. According to Faulkner, when Hume 
states that the credibility of the testimony depends on observation even if the 
hearer is neither in a position nor eager to verify it, he does not mean that 
the hearer infers the credibility of the testimony from the memories of 
his/her past observations of the regular conjunction between the speaker’s 
assertion and the facts reported by the speaker’s assertion. Faulkner argues 
that one can correctly and differently interpret Hume’s concept of testimony. 
However, the question is if Faulkner refuses to accept that the hearer infers 
the credibility of the speaker’s testimony from his past observation, then 
how can he explain it? To answer this question, Faulkner argues that the 
hearer can directly gain the credibility of the speaker’s testimony when 
he/she is neither able to empirically verify it nor eager to personally verify 
it.   
However, how is the credibility of the speaker’s testimony judged 
directly by the hearer? To answer this question, Faulkner discusses a passage 
from the Treatise of Human Nature,
29
 wherein Hume says that testimonial 
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 “The words or discourses of others have an intimate connexion with certain ideas 
in their mind; and these ideas have also a connexion with the facts or objects, 
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beliefs are based on causal relationship. Testimony is an effect and the 
actual facts presented by the testimony are a cause. According to Hume, the 
causal relationship between two events is discovered by experience. Human 
nature forces one to accept a connection between these two events which one 
is observing regularly or uniformly. This constant and uniform conjunction 
(without any exception) between two events is called a “causal 
relationship”. On the basis of this causal relationship, one is ab le to derive 
existence of cause from the effect. Similarly, one is able to derive the 
existence of facts (which are presented by a certain type of testimony), when 
one receives a certain type of testimony (Faulkner 1998, 306-307). However, 
according to Hume, unlike other derivation depending on causal relationship,  
credibility or trustworthiness of the testimony is directly derived from the 
speaker’s testimony on the basis of causal reasoning, even though we are 
occasionally skeptical about the speaker’s testimony. For example, if the 
speaker is a doubtful individual or if the speaker delivers their assertion with 
                                                                                                                                          
which they represent. This latter connexion is generally much over-rated, and 
commands our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from 
nothing beside the resemblance betwixt the ideas and the facts. Other effects only 
point out their causes in an oblique manner; but the testimony of men do es it 
directly, and is to be considered as an image as well as an effect. No wonder, 
therefore, we are so rash in drawing our inferences from it, and are less guided by 
experience in our judgments concerning it, than in those upon any other subject .” 




hesitation, then one should be skeptical and hesitate to accept the testimony. 
30
   
However, here I would like to say that since Hume does not provide a 
well-structured scheme of testimony, there is much confusion about how the 
hearer judges the credibility of the speaker’s testimony when he/she is 
neither able to empirically verify them, nor eager to personally verify them. 
Hume states that “. . . our inference from cause to effect and effect to cause” 
(Hume 1965, 113), and credibility or trustworthiness of the testimony 
depends on the causal principle; on the basis of this statement Coady 
interprets Hume’s concept of testimony as that the hearer infers the 
credibility of the speaker’s testimony on the basis of observation based 
general maxim when he/she is neither able to empirically verify it nor eager 
to personally verify it. Instead, Faulkner interprets Hume’s concept of 
testimony differently on the basis of Hume’s assertion that “Other effects 
only point out their causes in an oblique manner; but the testimony of men 
does it directly” (Hume 1965, 113). According to Hume, it is true that one 
can infer cause from effect or effect from cause, however , in the case of 
testimony, credibility or trustworthiness of the testimony is known directly. 
On the basis of this ground, Faulkner argues that the hearer knows 
credibility or trustworthiness of the testimony directly. However, Hume does 
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 “We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses 
contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they 
have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver thei r testimony with 
hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other 
particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any 
argument, derived from human testimony.” (Hume 2000, 85; Faulkner 1998, 307)  
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not provide any explanation for why he claims that the knowledge of 
credibility or trustworthiness (cause) is derived directly from testimony. 
This causes much confusion because Hume typically states that we generally 
infer cause from effect and effect from cause. However,  both Coady and 
Faulkner agree that Hume endorses a form of global reductionism. Thus, 
even though Coady and Faulkner both agree that, Hume believes 
trustworthiness or credibility of the testimony ultimately depends on 
empirical evidence, they differ in explaining how the hearer knows the 
credibility of the speaker’s testimony when he/she is not able to empirically 
verify it or not eager to personally verify it. Coady argues that Hume 
believes that the hearer infers the credibility of the speaker’s testimon y; 
however, Faulkner says that Hume believes that the hearer directly knows 
the credibility of the speaker’s testimony.   
In this context, I might say that even though Faulkner rejected 
Coady’s interpretation of Humean testimony, he does not reject Coady’s  
entire objection against Hume’s concept of reductionism. Therefore, Coady’s 
objection against the Humean account of reductionism remains unresolved.   
Michael Welbourne (2002), however, does not accept Coady’s and 
Faulkner’s explanation that Hume is a reductionist. According to Welbourne, 
there is another way of reading Hume and explaining the Humean account of 
testimony, which corresponds with Hume’s empiricist explanation of the 
belief-forming mechanism and is also more acceptable than other 
explanations of the testimony.  According to Welbourne, when Hume argues 
that if two objects have any discoverable connection with each other (which 
he called a causal connection or relationship between cause and effect), and 
we derive one from the other on the basis of that connection, then the 
connection between them must have been discovered by our previous 
experience of their constant and regular association/connection. On this 
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ground one should reject any a priori connection between testimony and 
reality. According to Welbourne, when Hume argues that the reason for 
drawing one conclusion from another based on a causal connection is 
founded on experience, therefore, he rejects any apriori connection between 
them; he does not accept an exception to this maxim in favor of human 
testimony. Hence, the credibility of the speaker’s testimony is based on 
empirical evidence (i.e., constant and regular association of the speaker’s 
statements or reports with the reality). Therefore, when we assign credibility 
to a witness, it is not because we perceived an apriori connection between 
his/her report and reality, but because we are accustomed to finding a 
connection between his/her reports and reality (Hume 2000, 85–86  
Welbourne 2002, 413-414). 
On the basis of this argument, critics, such as Coady, argue that 
Hume’s account of testimony is a global reductionism. However, Welbourne 
explains the Humean account of testimony differently (Welbourme 2002, 
414-415). According to Welbourne, to understand the Humean account of 
testimony, one must realize the position of a child at the point when he/she 
is beginning to learn language and, within a few years, becomes an expert in 
the language. For example, any child born into a particular linguistic 
community where testimonial utterances are common for exchanging one’s 
thoughts and beliefs with others in the same linguistic community often 
learns his/her language from his/her parents and family members. The 
parents and family members are very careful of their language in front of 
him/her. They utter “duck” when there is a duck or “car” when there is car 
and not otherwise. In this process, he/she notices a correlation between 
his/her parents’ uncategorized utterance of words such as “duck” and ducks, 
or “car” and cars, and so on. According to Welbourne, in this manner, a 
child begins to learn the meaning of those words and, at the same time, 
comprehends the idea of using words to report external states of affair. 
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He/she begins to learn the vocabulary and simultaneously practices’ using 
the vocabulary to express the fact. Therefore, according to Welbourne, when 
Hume claimed that we must experience a constant and regular association 
between testimony and reality in order to know something through 
testimony, then he might have meant this basic language learning process 
which is, at the same time, consistent with his empiricist stance; 
nevertheless, according to Welbourne, Hume does not offer much argument 
in its favor. However, there is no doubt that we are genetically programmed 
to learn a specific way of using the language for certain speech-acts of our 
community, which Hume does not refute. Rather, Hume believes human 
nature forces and programs human beings to act in a certain way, which is 
similar to doing something in the genetically programmed way. However, 
the truth is that Hume was entirely silent about the language-acquisition 
process of a child. Therefore, according to Welbourne, Hume does not 
develop a complete and comprehensive theory of testimony. Instead, he just 
reveals some signs of understanding the broad framework of a testimony 
theory. (Welbourne 2002, 416-417)   
 
2.6 My Understanding of Hume 
From the preceding discussion, we may conclude that epistemologists 
do not agree on the nature of the Humean account of testimony. Some 
epistemologists attempted to label Hume’s concept of testimony as  global 
reductionism; the others (such as Welbourne) refuted the claim. I, however, 
believe that those who believe that Hume’s account of testimony is a global 
reductionism do not highlight an extremely vital issue related to Hume’s 
scheme of testimony. In the present section, I explore and examine this 
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issue, which I believe will be more helpful to establish the account of 
testimony Hume attempted to develop through his writings.  
Before initiating this discussion, I recapitulate the previously 
discussed Humean theory of Ideas. According to Hume, objects of human 
reason may be divided into two categories: Relations of Ideas and Matters of 
Fact. Reasoning concerning relations of ideas is about the science of 
geometry, algebra, and arithmetic. To be concise, every proposition 
concerning relations of ideas is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. 
According to Hume, these types of propositions are not based on experience. 
In contrast, unlike proposition concerning relations of ideas, proposition 
concerning matters of fact is not intuitively or demonstratively certain. 
These types of propositions are possible because their falsification could 
never imply any contradiction. They are concerned with the material world, 
such as a table, chair, book, river, and mountain.  
Epistemologists, such as Coady, Faulkner, have focused only on 
proposition concerning matters of fact while discussing the Humean account 
of testimony; they have not paid attention to proposition concerning 
relations of ideas. I think that this is a major problem for understanding the 
Humean account of testimony. If these epistemologists had considered also 
propositions concerning relations of ideas, they would not have interpreted 
Hume as a global reductionist. Hume accepts experience-based proposition 
(i.e., reasoning concerning matters of fact), and is simultaneously interested 




2.7 Possibility of Testimony in Mathematics    
Testimony concerning relations of ideas (as in pure mathematics) is a 
highly controversial issue. In focus on it in this section I argue that if we 
establish the possibility of testimony concerning mathematics, then we can 
claim that Hume was not in a position to accept global reductionism in his 
account of testimony; otherwise we would fail to establish our position.  
According to some philosophers, (i.e., Williams 1972), a hearer is 
unable to acquire any mathematical knowledge through testimony. Williams 
claims that if someone believes a mathematically true proposition that P on 
the basis of good authority but cannot mathematically demonstrate it, then 
he/she does not know that P. For mathematical knowledge, a knower can 
know only intuitively or demonstratively, that is through apriori methods. 
Therefore, mathematical knowledge cannot be gained by testimony. 
However, the problem is if any expert of mathematics informs us of a 
mathematical fact, that P is true, then what should we acquire from the 
renowned mathematician’s statement? Should we not acquire the 
mathematical knowledge that P is true? Williams was well aware of this type 
of objections and responded by distinguishing between the notions of 
“knowing that P” and “knowing that P is a truth of a given science ,” and 
claims that it is possible for a knower to know that “P is a truth of a given 
science,” without knowing that P. Thus, in the given circumstances, 
according to Williams, a hearer can only know that P is a truth of 
mathematics without knowing that P. Williams argued that unless the hearer 
personally verifies the mathematical truth that P, he does not acquire the 
knowledge of P. In this sense, according to Williams, testimony has not the 
potentiality to provide mathematical knowledge (Williams 1972, 9).  
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Some epistemologists, for example, Coady, Geist, Lӧwe, and 
Kerkhove, have a different opinion concerning the possibility to acquire  
mathematical knowledge through testimony. According to Coady, when a 
mathematical expert informs us that P is true, on the basis of that assertion 
we not only know that P is a mathematical truth but also we know that P is 
true, because that P is true is a part of the knowledge that P is a truth of 
mathematics. Therefore, if someone knows that P is a truth of mathematics, 
he/she can easily conclude that P is true. After he/she concludes that P is 
true, he/she knows that P. According to Coady, “A knows that P is a truth of 
mathematics” entails “A knows that P is true,” and “A knows that P is true” 
entails “A knows that P.” Thus, we can rightly conclude that a knower 
knows that P when he knows that P is a truth of mathematics from a 
renowned mathematician’s statement. Thus, according to Coady, a hearer 
can acquire the mathematical knowledge from the statement(s) or writings of 
a renowned mathematician’s (Coady 1973, 252–254).  
Against Williams, Geist, Lӧwe, and Kerkhove contend further that 
mathematicians occasionally accept and use the results of the published 
literature in their own research without personally verifying it or 
meticulously checking for the accuracy of the theorems on which the ir 
results depend (Geist, Lӧwe, and Kerkhove, 2010; Coady 1997, 260.). 
Moreover, mathematicians occasionally use mathematical results without 
any personal verification because they are not competent to verify them or 
the proofs involve expertise in multiple areas of mathematics. For example, 
suppose a mathematician has specialized in a particular branch of 
mathematics, such as convex geometry, but does not possess much expertise 
in others branches of mathematics. The different branches of mathematics 
include mathematical logic, constructive mathematics, arithmetic, algebra, 
geometry, topology, applied mathematics, probability, and statistics, among 
others, which also contain sub branches. For instance, sub-branches of 
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mathematical logic include model theory, set theory, and proof theory; sub-
branches of algebra include order theory, and number theory. Therefore, we 
can consider the mathematician from the other branch as an outsider with 
respect to a particular theory of mathematics. Now, as an outsider, when 
he/she uses a result of other mathematical theories, he/she uses it without 
any verification and concern regarding the origin or method of that result 
because he/she is not competent to personally verify it. Mathematicians from 
different areas of specialization occasionally collaborate and obtain results 
on the basis of their individual results, which are not personally verified by 
each of them. They merely accept the other mathematicians’ results as true 




We should also consider the fact that currently, mathematical proofs 
are highly much dependent on the computer. Unless mathematicians accept 
the reliability of the computer, they cannot prove a mathematical notion. For 
example, our evidence of formal proofs in mathematics depends on the 
presupposition of the reliability of the computer. Therefore, similar to 
accepting a mathematician’s dependence on the computer and other 
mathematicians’ proofs, the laymen also accept what a renowned 
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 “For instance, a real analyst who is told that a certain tangential claim is 
equivalent to a large-cardinal axiom in set theory will stop working to prove it—
she has been told that these axioms are provably independent of ZFC, and does not 
need to work through this whole proof herself. Similarly, a topologist might reduce 
some claim to an algebraic one, and then just appeal to outside sources to convince 
herself that this algebraic claim is true. However, directly in the core parts of her 
own research, she will want to convince herself of everything and avoid trusting 
testimony.” (Easwaran 2009, 354)  
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mathematician may state about any mathematical truth (Coady 1997, 260; 
Easwaran 2009, 356).   
The above considerations suggest that mathematics gives us at least 
categorically more secure knowledge than other sciences  and, hence 
mathematics can be considered an “epistemic exception.”  Yet the issue is 
still highly debated and, in the present context, I do not take a position on it. 
Suffice to say that if someone hears from a renowned mathematician that P 
is true, he/she does not require any empirical evidence in order to accept the 
mathematician’s statement. If verification is required, it will be 
demonstrative. Therefore, I believe that, in order to verify the 
trustworthiness of the testimony concerning mathematical truth, which Hume 
considered as reasoning concerning relations of ideas, does not depend on 
any empirical evidence.  Hence, we are not entitled to label the Humean 






3.1 Fricker’s Local Reductionism 
In the previous chapter, I discussed in detail Hume’s concept of 
testimony. Moreover, I briefly illustrated the distinguishing features of 
reductionism and anti-reductionism. I now extend my enquiry to Elizabeth 
Fricker’s (1987; 1994; 1995; 2002; and 2006) concept of testimony, which 
is, undoubtedly, a type of reductionism, and stress differences (if any) 
between her account and Hume’s account .  
Fricker acknowledge that some knowledge concerning the external 
world and internal state of individuals depends on what other individuals in 
the same language group say. For example, an individual who has never 
visited the South Pole can acquire considerable knowledge regarding the 
South Pole from the writings of an expert, who has explored the region. 
Therefore, it is not difficult to have the knowledge of external world without 
knowing things directly; knowledge can be acquired through what is narrated 
by others or what is documented by experts. Similarly, we can know about 
an individual’s internal state through that individual’s oral or written 
statements. For example, a physician knows his/her patient’s internal state, 
such as whether he/she has a headache, from what the patient tells him/her or 
from the medical investigation reports of a competent authority. For 
instance, a computed tomography (CT) scan or magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) report indicates whether a patient has a brain tumour and whether that 
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tumour is causing the headaches experienced by the patient. Similarly, I can 
understand my childhood friend’s mental state from his/her letter. Therefore, 
Knowledge disseminates through language-use. 
 
3.2 Testimony and Individual’s Knowledge 
According to Fricker, when an individual becomes a competent 
language user, he/she is not confined to the range of his/her own perception, 
memories, and inferences to gain knowledge regarding the world. He/she can 
gain this knowledge through the oral or written testimonies of others 
belonging to his/her language community. However, how does an 
individual’s knowledge disseminates through the language with in the same 
language community? To answer this question, Fricker argues that in a 
particular language community, when an individual S believes that P, and 
wishes to communicate his/her belief that P, he/she makes an utterance, 
which constitutes his/her assertion of that P to his/her hearer H, who has an 
implicit command over his/her language. After knowing and understanding 
S’s assertions, the hearer H shares the same belief as S. For example, when 
an individual S believes that there is a dog in the garden, says that “There is 
a dog in the garden”, if H hears S’s assertion, H may acquire a similar belief. 
Now, (under certain condition) if S’s belief is knowledge, then H’s belief 
may also count as knowledge. The same applies when an individual H reads 
a written testimony. (Fricker 1987, 57; 2006, 229).  
It must be emphasized that the dissemination of knowledge through 
language is an extremely complex process. Both the speaker and hearer have 
significant roles in this process. In this context, I discuss significance of the 
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speaker and hearer in the epistemology of testimony in a very aphoristic 
way. Dissemination of the speaker’s knowledge that P to the hearer through 
language depends on the fulfilment of the following conditions:  
I. The speaker knows that P. 
II. The speaker is in a normal physical and mental state.  
III. The speaker does not intend to deceive his/her hearer or reader.  
IV. The hearer is competent in the language used by the speaker to 
express his/her knowledge that P. 
V. The hearer perfectly understands the meaning intentions of the 
speaker and the context of utterance. 
The first three conditions apply to the speaker, whereas the remaining 
two apply to the hearer. These conditions are crucial in the epistemology of 
testimony. In the absence of any of these conditions, the testimony cannot 
fulfill its purpose as a source of knowledge. For example, assume that Smith 
does not have any grounds to believe that John has a Ford. Furthermore, let 
us assume that John does not own a car at all. However, if Smith still asserts 
that John has a Ford to Peter, who is a common friend to both, then Peter 
will not gain any knowledge from Smith’s assertions. Therefore, the hearer 
H can gain knowledge from the speaker S’s assertion that P, only if it is 
based on the speaker’s knowledge that P.  
Similarly, let us assume that Smith is known to his friends and 
relatives as being mentally retarded or having a cognitive defect. 
Furthermore, assume that he saw Philip murdering Stephen the previous 
night. However, when Smith reports his eye-witness account to the police 
regarding the last night, they do not consider him a witness because he is 
mentally retarded and his assertion cannot be considered a source of 
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knowledge. Similarly, if a speaker has any physical problems, such as weak 
vision, hearing issues, and communication disorders, which affect the 
testimonial process directly or indirectly, his/her assertion cannot be 
considered a source of knowledge. Therefore, physical and mental health is a 
crucial condition for testimony.  
The third condition is the speaker’s moral character.  If the speaker is 
dishonest and has deceptive intentions, his/her assertions cannot be treated 
as testimony, because hearers do not gain any knowledge from such 
assertion. Therefore, the speaker should be sincere regarding his/her 
assertions.  
The fourth and fifth conditions are associated with the hearer. To gain 
knowledge from the speaker’s assertion, the hearer should have adequate 
competence in the speaker’s language. The phrases “adequate competence” 
instead of “competence” is used intentionally because if we emphasize on 
absolute competence, then it prevents young learners within a language 
community or new learners from other language communities from gaining 
any knowledge from a speaker’s assertion due to the lack of complete 
competence in the speaker’s language. Moreover, to gain knowledge from a 
speaker’s assertion, a hearer requires only enough competence rather than 
complete competence in the speaker’s language. Here, the word “enough” is 
crucial because it suggests that the hearer must have necessary and sufficient 
competence in the speaker’s language to completely understand and gain any 
knowledge from what the speaker intends to convey.  
According to the fifth condition, to gain knowledge from a speaker’s 
assertion, a hearer must understand the speaker’s intention because people 
are accustomed to using a particular word that refers to more than one object 
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in a particular language community. For example, the word “bank” is used to 
refer to the place where we keep our money, and the outskirts of the river or 
sea. If the speaker uses such a word in his/her assertion, then the hearer 
needs to know the meaning intentions and context in which that word is 
used.  
 
3.3 Justificationist and Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge 
Theories of knowledge are often divided into two main groups: 
internalist theories and externalist theories. For internalist theories of 
knowledge, a belief counts as knowledge only if the subject of the belief 
endorses some specific reasons that count as correct, for entertaining that 
belief. For externalist theories of knowledge, the main fact is the process 
causing the belief. If the process is reliable, that is, if it is generally 
conducive to truth, and the belief is true, then that belief counts as 
knowledge. Frickers rephrases the distinction between internalist theories 
and externalist theories in terms of a distinction between justificationist 
theories of knowledge and reliabilist theories of knowledge: 
“I shall define a justificationist theory of knowledge as any 
theory which includes a justification requirement on beliefs, 
for them to be knowledge. A reliablist theory is any theory 
which characterises knowledge in terms of some explication 
of the notion of ‘reliability’ of beliefs, e.g. as belief arrived 
at by a reliable method or mechanism. And I take a 
reliabilist theory to be one which does not include a 
justification requirement. With this proviso, the two 
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conceptions are indeed incompatible: that is to say, no 
theory of knowledge can be both a justificationist and a 
reliabilist theory, on these definitions.” (Fricker 1987, 59 – 
60) 
According to the justification theory,  a subject has knowledge only if 
his/her beliefs are grounded on (correct) reasons that he/she endorses . The 
reliability theory states instead that if a belief originates from a reliable 
method or mechanism, then we can consider it as knowledge.
32
 
According to Fricker, justificationists disagree with the reliabilist 
view that the way a belief was caused is the determining factor of 
knowledge. She denies that if a belief originates in a reliable way only then 
we can consider the belief as knowledge. However, within the justificationist 
framework of knowledge, is there any link between knowledge and how a 
belief is caused? If a link exists, then what is the nature of this connection? 
One might argue that an individual’s justification of his/her belief does not 
depend on how he acquired this belief. Fricker disagrees with this 
perspective, since she believes that the way a belief is caused plays a crucial 
role in the justificationist epistemology. 
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 Here, I would like to say that, I do not want to discuss Justificationism 
and Reliabilism in a detailed. Here, what I discussed about the Justificationism a nd 
Reliabilism, I discuss on the light of what Fricker presented them in her writings 
for the purpose to present her theory of testimony. To know the difference between 
Justificationism and Reliabilism in more detailed please see: F. P. Ramsey, Peter 
Unger, David Armstrong, Alvin Goldman, Robert Nozick , Duncan Pritchard, etc.. 
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According to Fricker, if we deny any such link between the ways a 
belief is caused and justification of the belief, then some beliefs, which are 
not considered knowledge, will claim the status of knowledge. For example, 
let us assume that an individual acquires a true belief through an 
epistemologically unrespectable process, such as brainwashing, and 
subsequently acquires satisfactory evidence favoring such a belief. If we 
deny any role to the link between the way a belief was originated and the 
justification of the belief in the justificationist epistemology, then we have 
to consider such a belief as knowledge, because this belief is a true and is 
supported by adequate evidence. Therefore, Fricker suggests that the link 
between the way a belief was caused and the justification of the belief must 
be considered in the justificationist epistemology to avoid such unacceptable 
beliefs from being considered knowledge.  
However, subsequently, the following question arises: if the way a 
belief originated plays a crucial role in the justificationist epistemology for 
considering a belief as knowledge, in other words, if the justification of a 
belief depends on the way it is caused, then how is this theory unique and 
different from the reliabilist theory? Fricker argues that when she claims that 
there is a link between the way a belief is caused and the justification of the 
belief, she does not imply that a certain belief is knowledge because it 
originated through a reliable process, as reliabilists claim. Rather, she 
claiming that, sometimes we consider a reliable process P as a justification 
for certain belief originated by P. The reliabilists do not present the way a 
belief was caused as a justification for that belief; they accept a belief as 
knowledge only because it is caused in a reliable way. Fricker argues  instead 
that sometimes an individual mentions a causal link or particular process that 
caused his/her belief as the justification for his/her belief. For example, 
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consider an individual A, who claims that he/she knows that P. Now, if 
someone challenges A to defend his/her claims, then, generally, to defend 
his/her claims that he/she knows that P, he/she will explain how he/she 
acquired his/her belief that P, for example, he/she saw it, remembered it, or 
inferred it. Therefore, by citing or recapitulating the ways his/her belief was 
caused, he/she actually provides some justification in favor of his/her 
belief.
33
 According to Fricker, this type of justification is considered as 
recapitulating justification or link-recapitulating justification. The individual 
recapitulates or cites the way in which he/she acquired the belief as a 
justification of that belief. We should note further that we never cite 
methods such as brainwashing and consumption (ingestion) of hallucinatory 
drugs, to defend our claims of knowledge because no justification is 
associated with such methods. Conversely, perception, memory, etc., are 
epistemologically respectable sources, which can be cited or recapitulated by 
an individual as a defense of his/her belief. Therefore, the way a belief was 
caused, can be considered as a favorable justification of the belief , and we 
may conclude that the justification of beliefs may be associa ted with the 
particular ways in which the beliefs are acquired (Fricker 1987, 65).  
According to Fricker, it is true that, sometimes, a certain type of 
justification may be associated with a particular way in which the belief was 
caused. However, this condition alone is not sufficient for justification; an 
additional condition is required for recapitulating justification.  
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 “Justification of belief of this kind work by citing or recapitulating the way in 
which the belief was cause.” (Fricker 1987, 65) 
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Let us assume that a subject S believes that P is caused by an 
epistemic link W and he/she recapitulates W to defend or justify his/her 
belief that P. According to Fricker, W must be a reliable belief-forming 
process and a certain type of justification for the belief that P may be 
associated with W.
34
 Suppose  now that S is unaware that a certain type of 
justification is associated with W. Could S in a position to present W as a 
justification for his/her belief that P? The answer to this question is in the 
negative for the following reason. To present a certain reliable belief-
forming process W as a justification for the belief acquired through W, the 
subject S must know that a certain type of justification is associated with W, 
in other words, S must know why he/she is presenting W as a justification of 
that P, and at the same time, S knows the premises (at least some of the 
premises) which justify his/her belief that P, as a consequence of the process 
of acquiring that P. Let me explain this through the following example: 
suppose John believes that there is honey for tea in the kitchen. Now, if 
someone asks him that why he believes it , he might say “I saw it.” Here, the 
belief that there is honey for tea in the kitchen is acquired through a reliable 
belief-forming process (perception) and John knows it; at the same time, 
John knows the premises (I saw it), that he presented as a justification for 
his belief. According to Fricker, here, the premise that “I saw it” is adequate 
for justifying John’s belief that there is honey for tea in the kitchen . This 
belief is justified by the process of seeing wherein he acquires the belief that 
he saw it and the very belief that he saw it.  
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 “. . . . certain type of justification for belie fs may be associated with a particular 
way in which beliefs are acquired. . . .” (Fricker 1987, 65)  
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What about the beliefs acquired through testimony?  Sometimes the 
subject cannot in a position to know, all of the adequate premises which 
he/she presented as justification of his belief, as a consequence of the belief -
forming process. For example, suppose John believes that there is honey for 
tea in the kitchen on the basis of Smith’s assertion. Now, if someone asks 
John why he believes that there is honey for tea in the kitchen, then he has to 
present a number of premises as a justification of his belief, such as, Smith 
asserted that there was honey for tea in the kitchen, Smith is a honest person, 
Smith kept the honey in the kitchen himself, Smith has no intention of 
deceiving others, Smith has adequate mental and physical  conditions, 
because only one premise, such as, “I acquired this belief on the basis of 
Smith’s assertion” (recapitulating the way John acquired the belief), is not 
adequate to justify John’s belief. Here, John cannot know all the premises 
presented to justify his belief as a consequence of the belief-forming 
process. He knows only one premise as a consequence of the belief -forming 
process; that is, Smith asserts that there is honey for tea in the kitchen. 
Therefore, John needs some other ways to know all the premises that he 
presented as a justification of his belief that there is a honey for tea. 
However, it is not possible (at every instance of testimony) to know whether 
the speaker is truly honest. According to Fricker, it is not necessary for the 
hearer to know whether the speaker is generally honest; it is sufficient for 
the hearer to have an appropriate reason to think (believe) that the speaker is 
sincere and competent about his/her assertion.
35
 Fricker believes that the 
additional information is associated with the speaker’s sincerity.  
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 “Note however that the hearer need not know the speaker to be generally honest; 
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From the aforementioned discussion, Fricker concludes that there are 
two types of reliable belief-forming process (which Fricker labels as 
epistemic link). According to Fricker, when the operation of the belief -
forming process places the subject in a position to know, as a consequence 
of the process, all the premises which are adequate to justify the belief 
acquired by the process, then the process is known as primary epistemic link 
or primary belief-forming process. As previously discussed, in the context of 
perception, as a consequence of his seeing, the subject can know all the 
premises that are adequate to justify the belief acquired by the process  of 
seeing. Therefore, according to Fricker, perception is a primary belief-
forming process or primary epistemic link. 
By contrast, when the operation of the belief-forming process places 
the subject in a position to know, as a consequence of the process, some of 
the premises which are adequate for justifying the belief acquired by the 
process, then the process is known as secondary belief-forming process or 
secondary epistemic link. As previously discussed, in the context of 
testimony, as a consequence of the testimonial process, the subject knows 
only certain premises that are adequate to justify the belief acquired by 
testimony. Therefore, according to Fricker, testimony is a secondary belief-
forming process or secondary epistemic link (Fricker 1987, 66–67).  
From the aforementioned discussion, Fricker formulates her 
justificationist theory, wherein the subject can legitimately present the way 
                                                                                                                                          
it is enough that he have some specific reason to (truly) think him to be sincere on 
the occasion in question.” (Fricker 1987, 73)   
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or process in which he/she acquired the belief as a justification of the belief 
acquired by that process, in the following way:  
“We may count a way of acquisition of beliefs W as an 
epistemic link, on our favoured justificationist theory, if the 
following two conditions hold:  
I. There is a type Jw of Justification for beliefs associated with 
W in our defined sense. 
II. At least sometimes when a subject has acquired a belief b 
through W he will, at least in part as a consequence of this 
process, be in a position to know the premises of a 
justification of the type Jw, and thus to offer this 
justification in defence of b.” (Fricker 1987, 66)  
Here, “J” represents justification, and “w” represents the way of 
acquiring the belief; hence, Fricker states that “Jw” refers to the process of 
justifying a belief by the way it was caused. A subject can legitimize the link 
between the way a belief is acquired and the justification of that belief, when 
the process or way in which the belief was acquired is accepted as a reliable 
epistemic source, and he/she knows the premises (at least some premises) 
which he/she presents as a justification for the belief as consequences of the 
process through which he/she acquired the belief.   
 
3.4 Sincerity of the Speaker in the Epistemology of Testimony 
In the context of Fricker’s formulation of recapitulating justification, 
we observed that when a subject acquires a belief on the basis of the 
 66 
 
speaker’s testimony, he/she needs some additional information about the 
speaker to justify his/her belief; such as whether the speaker is honest, 
speaker has no intention of deceiving the hearer, and so forth. According to 
Fricker, this additional information is associated with the speaker’s 
sincerity. Yet, how does the hearer know that the speaker is sincere in 
respect of his/her assertion of that P? According to anti -reductionists, a 
speaker’s sincerity and competence can be known without any additional 
evidence. This means that in any linguistic community, a speaker asserts that 
P only when he/she believes that P is true, and he/she is justified in 
believing that P. Therefore, a hearer has the right to consider that the 
speaker is sincere and competent, without any additional evidence,  when the 
speaker asserts that P.  
However, Fricker does not accept the convention of the perfectly 
sincere linguistic community, because one cannot completely exclude the 
practical possibility of the speaker’s insincerity. Moreover, if we assume that 
a linguistic community comprises members who are truly sincere and 
competent regarding their language-use, and they assert P only when P is 
true, and he/she is justified in believing that P with no intention of deceiving 
others, we still cannot exclude the possibility of human errors, mental and 
physical defects, and moral decline of the speaker. Assume that an individual 
S has defective color vision, such as red-green color blindness (protanopia), 
and is unaware of his/her color blindness. In such circumstance , a hearer 
cannot gain any knowledge regarding these particular colors from S’s 
assertion. If we now accept the anti-reductionist concept, which suggests 
that the hearer has every right to accept what the speaker says without any 
additional evidence, then we have to admit that the hearer can gain 
knowledge regarding the color from the speaker’s  (color blind) assertion. 
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Therefore, to avoid such practical possibilities of insincerity or 
incompetence, we must admit that additional evidence is required to asses s 
the speaker’s sincerity and competence at a particular occasion. 36 
From the aforementioned discussion, we conclude that Fricker’s 
concept of testimony, suggests that the speaker S and hearer H, when H 
believes that P based on a speaker’s assertion that P,  can defend his/her 
belief that P by saying that “S asserts that P.” .However, a mere citation of 
the ways his/her belief originated is not adequate to defend his/her belief 
that P; to defend his/her belief that P, an individual requires additional 
information concerning the speaker’s sincerity, competence, and his/her 
mental and physical conditions. However, how can a hearer assess the 
speaker’s sincerity and competence? Fricker answers that a hearer may have 
an existing dossier of information regarding the speaker, which provides the 
hearer with adequate reasons to believe in the speaker’s assertion. However, 
this explanation does not apply in the case of a stranger. Fricker states that 
even if the speaker is not known to the hearer, the hearer can derive adequate 
information about the speaker from his/her (the speaker’s) behavior (Fricker 
1987, 78). In my analysis of Hume’s reductionist account of testimony in the 
Chapter One, I discussed how a hearer determines whether a speaker is 
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 “Thus, I suggest, despite the conceptual constraints on interpretation it remains 
an empirical question whether particular speaker, on particular occasions, are 
either competent or sincere; one which a self-consciously rational belief-former 
will wish to have positive evidence about, before he believe what he is told.” 
(Fricker 1987, 76)  
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sincere from his/her behavior or gestures.
37
 Therefore, here, I do not discuss 
how a hearer derives the trustworthiness of a speaker from his/her behavior.   
However, as previously discussed, some epistemologists do not agree 
with the reductionist view. According to them, a hearer has a presumptive 
and epistemic right to trust an arbitrary speaker’s assertion that P. Fricker 
formulates this anti-reductionist view in the following way: 
“PR (presumptive right) thesis: On any occasion of 
testimony, the hearer has the epistemic right to assume, 
without evidence, that the speaker is trustworthy, i.e. that 
what she say will be true, unless there are special 
circumstances which defeat this presumption. (Thus she has 
the epistemic right to believe the speaker’s assertion, unless 
such defeating conditions obtain.)” (Fricker 1994, 125)  
According to the PR thesis, besides special circumstances involving a 
strong defeater, a hearer has an epistemic right to accept the speaker’s 
                                                 
37
 “. . . . . from the manner of their delivering their testimony; . . . . . when they 
deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, . . . . . There are many 
other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any 
argument, derived from human testimony.” (Hume 2000, 85)  
“. . . . . . when the speaker is unknown to him, cues in his behaviour (for example 
shiftiness, or its opposite), and other relevant background information may provide 
an adequate basis for justified true belief in his sincerity and competence.” (Fricker 
1987, 78)    
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statement’s trustworthiness, without any additional evidence. Fricker 
suggests that a testimony can be considered as a source of knowledge if the 
PR thesis is combined with a negative claim (NC) that the trustworthiness of 
a speaker is not assessable by a hearer. Fricker formulates an NC in the 
following way: 
“Negative Claim: It is not, generally speaking, possible for a 
hearer to obtain independent confirmation that a given 
speaker is trustworthy – that what she says will be true.” 
(Fricker 1994, 125) 
According to Fricker, the PR thesis depends on an NC because PR 
thesis holds only if the NC is true. If we find any exceptions to the NC, such 
as a possibility for the hearer to obtain an independent confirmation of a 
speaker’s trustworthiness, then we cannot claim that a hearer has PR to 
accept (believe) the speaker’s assertion without any additional evidence. 
Unless we accept that the NC is true, the PR thesis cannot be upheld. 
Fricker’s reductionism more consists in rejecting PR by rejecting NC. We 
shall see that she has also an independent argument for rejecting PR directl y. 
In section 3.5 I elaborate Fricker’s notion of trustworthiness; in section 3.6 I 
present her rejection of PR by rejecting NC and in section 3.7 her rejection 
of PR directly.  
 
3.5 Nature of the Speaker’s Trustworthiness  
Before discussing how Fricker refutes the NC (the hearer cannot 
obtain independent confirmation of the speaker’s trustworthiness), let me  
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discuss her views on the nature of trustworthiness. Fricker defined 
trustworthiness as a property or virtue of the speaker, the knowledge of 
which bridges the logical and epistemic gaps between the speaker’s assertion 
and reality.
38
 For example, when a speaker S asserts that P on an occasion O 
to a hearer H, if H’s knowledge regarding S is sufficient for H to bridge the 
logical and epistemic gaps on the occasion O between S’s assertion that P 
and P, then the hearer has the basis to justifiably believe that P. However, 
for every assertion, a hearer cannot know whether a speaker has a strong 
gap-bridging property. For instance, when an unknown speaker asser ts that P 
to a hearer H, then H may not have a sufficiently strong ground for 
considering the speaker as a trustworthy person that can bridge the gap 
between his/her assertion of that P and P. To resolve this issue, Fricker 
argues in the following way: 
“If H can know that S possesses this weakest gap-bridging 
property on an occasion O, this is enough to justify her in 
believing that S asserts on O; thus it is only this weakest 
gap-bridging property which must admit of non-circular 
confirmation, to provide a reductive solution to the problem 
of justifying testimony, as we have conceived it.” (Fricker 
1994, 129) 
                                                 
38
 “. . . . it must be a property of the speaker S knowledge of which suffices, 
for a hearer H on the occasion O, to bridge the logical and epistemic gap between 
‘S assertion that P’ and ‘P’.” (Fricker 1994, 129)  
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Therefore, according to Fricker a weakest gap-bridging property is 
sufficient for a hearer to justify himself/herself to believe what is asserted by 
a speaker even if the hearer knows that the speaker possesses a weak gap 
bridging property.  
However, one may ask when the hearer can consider that the speaker 
S possesses the property or virtue knowledge of which bridges the gap 
between S’s assertions of that P and P? To answer this question, Fricker 
introduced a trust condition.
39
 If a speaker fulfills the trust condition, only 
then we can consider the speaker as trustworthy. Fricker formulates the trust 
condition as follows: 
“Trus1: If S were to assert that P on O, then it would be the 
case that P.” (Fricker 1994, 132) 
This condition ensures that the speaker is sincere about his/her 
assertion. We may consider a speaker sincere about his/her assertion that P 
only if he/she asserts that P when P is true. If a speaker asserts that P on 
occasion O and P is false, then we do not consider the speaker as sincere. 
When a speaker is sincere about his/her assertions, then we can trust him/her 
whenever he/she asserts that P. Therefore, if we know that the speaker is 
                                                 
39
 “ To find such a notion: which just suffices, together with ‘S asserted that P on 
O’, to entail ‘P’; which constitutes a genuine property of S, hence, flukes and 
special cases apart, is epistemically independent of ‘P’; and which constitutes an 
explication of the intuitive notion of S’s being trustworthy on an occasion of 
testimony, is our aspiration.” (Fricker 1994, 132)  
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sincere about his/her assertion, then we can legitimately derive P from 
his/her assertion that P.  
However, sincerity or Trus1 condition is not sufficient to consider a 
speaker trustworthy, because this condition is not adequate to bridge the gap 
between the speaker’s assertions that P and P. For example, assume that a 
speaker S has always been sincere. Therefore, when S asserts that P, and P is 
accepted by H because he/she trusts S. Furthermore, suppose that P is false. 
Then H does not gain any knowledge from S’s assertions that P. Therefore, 
the sincerity or Trus1 condition is not sufficient to bridge the gap between 
the testimony and reality (Fricker 1994, 145).  
To avoid such errors Fricker introduced another Trust condition or 
Trus2. According to Fricker: 
“Trus2: If S were to assert that P on O, then it would the 
case that S’s assertion is sincere, and that the belief she 
thereby expresses is true.” (Fricker 1994, 146) 
 
According to Trus2, a hearer H is entitled to consider a speaker S 
trustworthy when the speaker’s assertion that P is sincere on occasion O , and 
the assertion conveys the reality. Thus, if S’s assertion that P is sincere, then 
P is true. If P is false, then the speaker’s assertion cannot be considered 
sincere. In the formulation of Trus2, Fricker shifts the sincerity notion from 
the speaker to his/her assertion. In the Trus1 condition, Fricker argues that 
the speaker is sincere. This allows the possibility of honest errors. Despite 
the speaker’s sincerity, he/she can assert that P by mistake when P is false. 
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We cannot mark the speaker as insincere for this mistake. Therefore, we may 
conclude that a sincere speaker can erroneously assert that P on the occasion 
O, which does not represent the actual fact, without affecting his/her 
sincerity. In Trus2 we have that an assertion is sincere only if it expresses 
the fact(s). There is no scope for an honest error. Therefore, Fricker resolved 
the possibility of error by shifting the sincerity notion from the speaker to 
his/her assertion. 
The next question that follows is, “How can the hearer H know that 
the speaker S’s assertion that P on the occasion O is sincere?” This question 
can be answered if a hearer relies on certain features of the speaker’s 
assertion, such as the tone of voice and manner of presentation, to assess the 
sincerity of the speaker’s assertion. However, the tone of the voice or the 
manner of presenting the assertion is directly associated with the speaker’s 
behavior; therefore, if we determine the sincerity of the speaker’s assertion 
or utterance based on the aforementioned conditions, then the sincerity of 
the assertion will be the same as the sincerity of the speaker. Moreover, if 
the speaker can control his/her behavior while he/she is uttering something 
false or if the hearer is not efficient in understanding the speaker’s behavior, 
then the hearer may consider an assertion sincere when it is not.  
 
After acknowledging these problems, Fricker formulates the speaker’s 
trustworthiness with respect to an utterance U in the following way: 
“Trus(S, U): A speaker S is trustworthy in respect to an 
assertoric utterance by her U, which is made on an occasion 
O, and by which she assert that P, if and only if  
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(i) U is sincere, and 
(ii) S is competent with respect to ‘P’ on O, where this 
notion is define as follows: 
If S were sincerely assert that P on O, then it would be the 
case that P.” (Fricker 1994, 147)   
In this formulation, Fricker combines the sincerity of the speaker and 
utterance which were previously discussed in the Trus1 and Trus2. We have 
now that if of the both a speaker and his/her assertion are sincere, then the 
speaker is trustworthy.  
Finally, she remarks that her formulation of trustworthiness of the 
speaker is weaker than what the common people think about it. In daily life, 
we consider a speaker as trustworthy or reliable if the speaker is competent 
in most of his/her assertions. Therefore, according to commonsense, we can 
consider a speaker trustworthy if he/she is generally sincere about his/her 
assertion. However, Fricker suggests that a speaker S who is well-known for 
being untrustworthy (based on the commonsense) can satisfy Trus(S, U) and 
a hearer H can consider S as trustworthy. According to Fricker’s formulation 
of trustworthiness with respect to a particular utterance U and on the basis of 
the knowledge regarding the speaker’s trustworthiness, a hearer H gains 
sufficient ground(s) to believe what is asserted by speaker S. Therefore, 
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Trus(S, U) is the minimal gap-bridging property between a speaker’s 




3.6 Rejection of the Negative Claim 
Nevertheless, on an occasion O, can a hearer know a speaker’s 
trustworthiness, sincerity of his/her utterance, and his/her competence with 
respect to the content of his/her assertion that P?  Fricker argues that a 
speaker’s trustworthiness can be confirmed empirically. There are two 
alternative approaches regarding the knowledge of a speaker’s 
trustworthiness. According to Fricker, on a particular occasion O, when a 
speaker S utters U and thereby asserts P to the hearer H, the H has or can 
gain independent evidence, which is sufficient to warrant H to consider S 
trustworthy in terms of U on O (Fricker 1994, 133). For instance, imagine a 
situation where two individuals, Jack and John, who know each other 
sufficiently and have been working in the same office for a long time. In 
addition, assume that both have a meeting to attend at the head office, with 
their boss next Monday. On Sunday evening, Jack calls John and informs 
that their boss called and informed him that tomorrow’s  meeting will be held 
in their office instead of the head office. Therefore, they do not have to go to 
                                                 
40
 “. . . . . . a person S who is untrustworthy, in this generalized sense, can still be 
trus(S, U), and known by a hearer H to be so, with respect to particular Utterance 
U; in which case, H has grounds to believe what is asserted by that utterance.” 
(Fricker 1994, 147–148) 
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the head office. In this situation, based on past experiences, John vaguely 
knows about Jack’s honesty; Jack has no intention of deceiving others and 
possesses a good moral character. Therefore, John has sufficient evidence to 
justifiably believe that Jack informed him regarding the meeting. Therefore, 
it can be inferred that a hearer may possess sufficient evidence to consider a 
particular speaker S as trustworthy in terms of his/her utterance U on the 
occasion O.  
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that sometimes a hearer can 
possess sufficient information regarding the speaker to consider him/her 
trustworthy; however, it is unclear, what happen if a hearer cannot gain 
independent sufficient information to consider the speaker trustworthy. 
Therefore, we extend our previous example. Assume that John recently 
joined a new office where his friend Jack has been working for a long time. 
Moreover, assume that he has a meeting with his boss in the head office next 
Monday. David, one of John’s colleagues, informs him on Sunday evening 
that he received a call from their boss saying that he will be coming to their 
office tomorrow to meet them. Therefore, they do not have to go the head 
office. In this situation, John does not have sufficient knowledge regarding 
David that can help him in determining David’s trustworthiness. However, if 
required, John can gain sufficient information regarding David from his 
friend Jack who has been working with David for a long time. Therefore, the 
claim (NC) that the hearer cannot obtain an independent confirmation 
regarding a given speaker’s trustworthiness is not accepted, because 
sometimes a hearer has or can gain the additional knowledge which is 




3.7 Rejection of the Presumptive Right Thesis  
Furthermore, Fricker rejects the PR thesis directly without rejecting 
the NC, which is the basis of the PR thesis, in two ways. First, Fricker 
argues that the PR thesis may be defined in two ways: strong and weak. A 
strong PR thesis claims that the hearer legitimately accepts a speaker’s 
assertion, without any evidence or assessment, like a new learner accepts a 
speaker’s assertion without verification. A new learner accepting a speaker’s 
assertion without any assessment or verification is considered as a “simple 
trust” mechanism. The strong PR thesis legitimizes the “simple trust” 
concept to yield knowledge. However, according to Fricker, when a new 
learner learns a language or gains other information, such as about social 
relationships, basic science, history, and geography, then he/she trusts what 
his/her parents, elderly people, or teachers tell or teach him/her, because new 
learners lack the conceptual capacity to judge their reliability or 
trustworthiness. Therefore, in this stage a hearer trusts the speaker’s 




                                                 
41
 “By ‘simple trust’ I mean: trusting response to what others tell or teach us, by 
one who as yet lacks the conceptual resources to entertain doubt about the 
reliability of others’ teaching. This the inevitable initial condition of the infant 
learning its first words through interaction with its carers. (However many writers 
on testimony exaggerate how long this initial condition persist –don’t underestimate 
children–they get wise pretty soon! See Clement, Koenig, and Harris (2004).).” 
(Fricker 2006, 245) 
 78 
 
Now, Fricker claims that the strong PR thesis overlooks the fact that 
an adult who masters his/her language can assess the speaker’s 
trustworthiness, and hence be more critical and not accept every assertion of 
the speaker blindly as he/she was accustomed to in the early stages. Note 
further that as time passes, even a hearer indulging in simple trust does not 
accept the speaker’s assertion blindly; he/she usually questions the speaker 
and his/her intentions. When a new learner gradually masters a particular 
language, his/her attitude toward speakers changes. Unlike previously, when 
he/she accepted the speaker’s assertion blindly, he/she now might question 
the speaker’s assertion; and refuse to accept the speaker’s assertion without 
assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness. According to Fricker, a major 
drawback of the strong PR thesis is that it only considers the “simple trust” 
stage and excludes the developed stage by concluding that the hearer need 
not assess the speaker’s trustworthiness before accepting his/her assertion 
(Fricker 1995, 400–404). 
However, apart from Fricker’s argument,  I would like to present an 
independent argument for rejecting PR thesis. I do not believe that when a 
child accepts a speaker’s assertion without any assessment, he/she is 
accepting the assertion on the basis of PR thesis. A simple truster, such as a 
child, cannot know or judge his/her PR to accept the speaker’s assertion, 
similar to how he/she cannot assess the speaker’s trustworthiness. I would 







 is a child and S
2
 is an adult and both want to 
learn a new language. If we momentarily accept the anti -reductionist claims 
that there is a convention in a linguistic community that the speaker S asserts 
that P only when P is true, the hearer has a right to accept the speaker’s 
assertion unless there is a strong reason for not accepting. From the 
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convention of the linguistic community, anti-reductionists formulate the 
founding argument of their theory of testimony, which is presumptive right 
PR (discussed previously). Occasionally, epistemologists formulate the 
fundamental argument of anti-reductionism as Default Rule (DR) or 
Acceptance Principle (AP). Essence of PR and DR or AP is equivalent. 
According to the DR thesis, “If the speaker S assert that p to the hearer H, 
then, under normal condition, it is correct for H to accept (believe) S’s 
assertion, unless H has special reason to object .” (Adler 2012, 12) Burge 
formulates Acceptance Principle in the following manner: “A person is 
entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is 
intelligible to him, unless there are strong reasons not to do so .” (Burge 
1993, 467) However, if we analyze the preceding argument, then we will 
find that it applies only to S
2 
(mature or adult human being) and not to S
1
 
(the child); because, only an adult human being with adequate knowledge of 
a language and social conventions, can know the convention of a linguistic 
community which is the basis of the anti-reductionist theory of testimony. A 
child S
1
 cannot know about the social and linguistic convention. Therefore, 
one cannot rightly claim that the simple truster accepts the speaker’s 
assertion on the basis of presumptive right (PR); hence, all simple truster s 
cannot know or access the presumptive right thesis even within the anti -
reductionist framework of epistemology of testimony. Hence, we cannot 
establish a strong PR thesis based on “simple trust.”  
To counter Fricker’s concerns, anti-reductionists may formulate a 
weak PR thesis which states that an individual S, who is the master of the 
commonsense language (CSL), is conceptually equipped to play the role of a 
sincere speaker and hearer. In addition, he/she appreciates the need for 
assessment of the speaker’s trustworthiness, without assuming any 
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generalized epistemic rights regarding the speaker’s trustworthiness. 
Furthermore, S possesses an epistemic right to presume the trustworthiness 
of an arbitrary speaker, without any favorable evidence. The hearer does not 
require independent evidence to accept what is told by the speaker every 
time. However, the hearer must judge the speaker’s trustworthiness when 
he/she feels challenged. For example, assume that Stephen is a sincere 
speaker and hearer and appreciates the need for assessment of the speaker’s 
trustworthiness. He may not verify the trustworthiness of a speaker’s every 
assertion. For example, when talking to his friends and colleagues, he might 
accept their assertion without any verification. However, he is always open 
to verifying their trustworthiness if he feels challenged regarding their 
assertion. Therefore, his attitude toward the speaker’s trustworthiness is 
different from the strong PR thesis. This is a local PR thesis because its 
claim is local (Fricker 1994, 141–142). 
Sometimes, defeating conditions cancel the hearer’s epistemic right to 
believe a speaker’s assertion. For example, suppose a speaker asserts that P 
on the occasion O to a hearer H. If H obtains a defeating condition, which 
defeats the speaker’s trustworthiness or the possibility of the speaker’s 
assertion of that P, then H cannot believe that P. Fricker differentiated 
between strong and weak defeating conditions. A defeating condition 
occasionally cancels the hearer’s right to presume that the speaker’s 
assertion is true, without providing any definite evidence for its falsity. This 
condition is considered weak defeating condition (or presumption-defeating). 
Alternatively, when a defeating condition directly falsifies a speaker’s 
assertion, it is considered a strong defeating condition (or proposition-
defeating). According to Fricker, when a hearer is aware of the defeating 
condition (i.e., either weak or strong), he/she must not believe a speaker’s 
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assertion without further verification (Fricker 1994, 142). For example, 
suppose David, Philips, Stephen, and John are common friends and are 
invited for a dinner on Saturday at 8.30 pm. Assume that John forgets the 
date and time of the dinner, he asks his friends and, surprisingly, each of  
their responses contradict that of the other: David says that the dinner is on 
Friday at 7.00 pm, Philips says that the dinner is on Saturday at 7.00 pm, and 
Stephen says that the dinner is on Saturday at 8.30 pm. In this situation, each 
of their responses is a defeating condition for that of the other. Therefore, 
John does not gain any knowledge from their responses without further 
verification. According to Fricker, this defeating condition is weak, because 
John does not have any definite evidence to falsify their assertion. In this 
situation, if John directly calls his friend who is hosting the dinner, and 
ascertains the actual date and time, then the host’s assertion directly falsifies 
the assertions of David and Philips. Therefore, the host’s assertion  can be 
considered a strong defeating condition.  
However, when an individual S is unaware of a defeating condition, 
what should he/she do? According to the PR thesis, an individual S has the 
PR to assume, without any evidence, that the speaker is trustwor thy and 
accept his/her assertion. For example, if we modify our previous example 
where John forgets the date and time of a dinner and asks only David, who 
informs him that the dinner is on Friday at 7.00 pm. Because, there is no 
defeating condition, John has the PR to accept what is told by David, despite 
David’s assertion being false. To avoid these issues, Fricker argued that an 
epistemologically responsible individual should always engage in some 
assessment of the speaker’s trustworthiness. If a hearer H  believes P, (when 
he/she does not have any defeating condition that defeats the speaker’s 
assertion) on the basis of a speaker’s assertion without assessing the 
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speaker’s trustworthiness, then it must be considered epistemic gullibility 
(Fricker 1994, 142–143). Therefore, the PR thesis should not be accepted. A 
hearer must assess a speaker’s trustworthiness, regardless of the presence of 
a defeating condition, before accepting his/her assertion.  
However, Fricker does not claim that the hearer must assess the 
speaker’s trustworthiness in a strong sense. Because, if we claim that a 
hearer always assesses the speaker’s trustworthiness in a strong sense, then 
we cannot maintain our daily interaction. Fricker’s argument can be clarified 
by an example. Assume that a person P is waiting on a railway platform 
(platform number 1) for a train T
1
, wherein he/she has a reservation. 
Suddenly, he/she hears an announcement regarding a change in the arrival 
platform because of technical reasons and realizes that T
1
 will arrive on 
platform number 3 instead of platform number 1. What should P do in this 
situation? Should he/she follow the strong assessment theory and assess the 
speaker’s trustworthiness before accepting his/her assertion? According to 
Fricker, P cannot assess the speaker’s trustworthiness in a strong sense in 
this situation, because if he/she tries to assess the speaker's trustworthiness 
in a strong sense, then he/she might miss the train. Therefore, in such a 
situation, P need not assess the speaker’s trustworthiness in a strong sense.  
However, the question is, when Fricker argues that a hearer need not 
assess the speaker’s trustworthiness in a strong sense, then what does the 
argument mean? Does it mean that in this situation, the person P has the PR 
to accept the speaker’s assertion unless there is a strong reason for rejection? 
To answer this question, Fricker states that P can accept the speaker’s 
assertion without any assessment not because of a PR, but because the 
present situation demands his/her acceptance of the assertion. According to 
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Fricker, the hearer’s attitude toward the speaker is always critical, even in 
the present situation. The hearer should not take the speaker’s assertion for 
granted; he/she should evaluate the speaker’s trustworthiness based on the 
available evidence. Therefore, the hearer’s attitude toward a speaker may 
change on the basis of situation. Although the hearer should not generally 
accept the speaker’s assertion on the basis of a PR, sometimes, a hearer can 
accept a speaker’s assertion without assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness. 
For example suppose a person P waiting for a train T
1
 on platform number 1 
is informed by his/her co-passenger at the last moment that the arrival 
platform has changed. In this situation, P accepts his/her co-passenger’s 
assertion on the basis of very little evidence without a strong assessment of 
the co-passenger’s trustworthiness, such as the gestures of his/her co -
passenger, and acts accordingly. However, P’s attitude toward his/her co -
passenger is not in line with the PR thesis. P does not accept the co-
passenger’s assertion on the basis of a PR; rather he/she accepts the co -
passenger’s assertion on the basis of the demand of the situation. P’s attitude 
will change in different situations. For example, suppose P is informed about 
such a change from his/her co-passenger and he/she has sufficient time to 
verify the co-passenger’s assertion regarding the platform not being 
changed, then P must verify his/her co-passenger’s trustworthiness from a 
different source, such as the railway enquiry office. Therefore, Fricker 
suggested that a hearer’s attitude toward a speaker is evaluative. The hearer 
must always assess or evaluate the speaker’s trustworthiness before 
accepting his/her assertion, regardless of the hearer’s assessment or 
evaluation not being in a strong sense (Fricker 1994, 149–150). 
In addition Fricker accepts a default position norm DPN. However, 
Fricker’s DPN differs from the PR and default rule (DR) accepted by anti -
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reductionists, I discuss the distinguishing features of the DR , PR and DPN 
theses. 
According to the DR thesis, under normal circumstances, a hearer H is 
entitled to accept (believe) the speaker S’s assertion, unless H has a valid 
reason for not accepting. Burge offers apriori defense of the DR thesis, 
which is known as the acceptance principle (AP). Burge formulates the 
acceptance principle in the following way: 
“A person is entitled to accept as true something that is 
presented as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there 
are strong reasons not to do so.” (Burge 1993, 467)  
According to this principle, when a speaker S asserts that P to a 
hearer H, S presents that P as the truth; therefore, H is entitled to accept that 
P as true, unless he/she has a strong reason for not accepting. Fricker 
formulated the same principle differently, which is known as the PR thesis 
(Fricker 1994, 125). The fundamentals of the PR, DR, and AP are the same. 
The PR thesis has been discussed previously, and therefore I do not discuss 
it in detail.  
However, Fricker’s DPN thesis differs from the PR or DR theses. 
According to the DPN thesis, we can differentiate the content of the 
speaker’s assertion based on the “commonsense person theory.” 42 First, 
                                                 
42
 “....I suggest, the same is true regarding a speaker’s competence, with respect to 
a certain range of subject matters  – namely, all those for which commonsense 
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content on which people’s assertion are nearly always right. Second, content 
on which people’s assertion are often, even in some cases generally, wrong. 
According to the DPN thesis, when a speaker asserts regarding content on 
which people’s assertion are nearly always right, then the hearer can 
consider a speaker as competent and sincere and can accept the speaker’s 
assertion, unless he/she observes signs of duplicity. For example, if a 
stranger asks for directions to a young lady, then typically she will provide 
the right information. However, if the stranger asks a young lady for her 
address, name, or phone number, then the lady will probably provide the 
wrong information or refuse to provide information. Therefore, the DPN 
thesis suggests that a speaker can be considered to possess default 
competence based on the content(s) of his/her assertion, unless the assertion 
exhibits symptoms of duplicity. Albeit, the PR and DR theses do not clearly 
argue that the hearer must judge content of the speaker’s testimony before 
accepting any testimony. Therefore, the DPN thesis is not same as the PR or 
DR theses (Fricker 1994, 151; 1995, 401).  
                                                                                                                                          
person theory tells us that people are nearly always right about such thing.” 
(Fricker 1994, 151) 
“I shall suggest below that our attitude to others’ testimony should depend on its 
subject matter. The second is between deferent phases in the career of a recipient 
of testimony: the developmental and mature phases.” (Fricker 1995, 401)   
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3.8 Fricker’s Default Position Norm (DPN)  
From the aforementioned discussion, we may formulate Fricker’s 
DPN in the following way: 
DPN: In a specific occasion and content, a hearer H is 
entitled to accept a speaker S as competent and sincere, and 
accept his/her assertion, without assessing his/her 
trustworthiness, unless there are any signs of duplicity.          
However, is Fricker’s DPN different from the DR or PR theses, 
particularly the weak PR thesis which, recognizes the need for the 
assessment of speaker’s trustworthiness and accepts some assertions without 
the assessment? To answer this question, Fricker explained that the basic 
difference between DR or PR and DPN involves the hearer’s attitude toward 
the speaker. According to the DPN thesis, a hearer is always critical of 
toward the speaker’s trustworthiness.43 By contrast, the DR or PR theses 
allow the hearer to accept the speaker as trustworthy, unless there are special 
circumstances compelling the hearer to act differently. Nevertheless, a weak 
PR thesis recognizes the need for assessment of speaker’s trustworthiness to 
accept a speaker’s assertion when he/she feels challenged by questions. 
However, he/she can accept a speaker’s assertion based on his/her PR 
                                                 
43
 “....the hearer should be discriminating in her attitude to the speaker, in that the 
hearer should be critically evaluating him (speaker) for trustworthiness throughout 




without assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness and even without having a 
critical attitude toward the speaker, when he/she does not feels challenged.
44
 
Therefore, the attitude toward the speaker is not the same in both the 
theories. 
Moreover, DPN allows the hearer to accept the speaker’s assertion as 
a default competence in limited circumstances and regarding limited content 
based on the commonsense person theory, whereas the DR or PR theses 
entitle the hearer to accept the speaker as competent or trustworthy without 
considering the content and circumstances of the assertion, unless he/she has 
valid reason for not accepting. Therefore, the DPN is not the same as the DR 
or PR theses (Fricker 1994, 154–155). 
 
3.9 Fricker’s Concept of Reductionism  
The preceding discussion shows that Fricker’s account of the 
epistemology of testimony is reductionist, because she denies the PR thesis 
and argues in favor of reductionism. This led me to ask which type of 
reductionism Fricker develops. Does she argue in favor of global 
reductionism or does she develop her concept of testimony as a local 
reductionism? This question can be answered in two ways. Let must 
recapitulate Fricker’s argument. She broadly divides the development of a 
                                                 
44
 “My account requires a hearer always to take critical stance to the speaker, to 
assess her for trustworthiness; while a true PR thesis, as we have seen , does not.” 
(Fricker 1994, 154) 
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hearer into different stages, namely the simple trust and the master or 
developed stages. She contends that when an individual learns his/her native 
or any other language, he/she accepts the speaker’s assertion without 
assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness, because he/she is not in a position to 
assess the speaker’s trustworthiness at that stage. Therefore, it is impossible 
for a hearer to follow reductionism in the “simple trust” stage.  
Second, even in the “master” or “developed” stage, the hearer 
sometimes cannot assess the speaker’s trustworthiness, because the present 
circumstances do not allow or permit him/her to assess the speaker’s 
trustworthiness before accepting. The circumstances compel the hearer to 
accept the speaker’s assertion without assessing his/her trustworthiness. 
However, Fricker adds that the hearer sometimes accepts the speaker’s 
assertion without assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness when the 
circumstances do not compel the hearer to accept, based on the 
commonsense person theory. According to Fricker, as social beings, we 
know that, sometimes, the speaker is nearly always right in some respect. 
Therefore, the hearer has a default right to accept the speaker’s assertion 
without assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness.  
We can thus conclude that for Fricker sometimes a hearer may accept 
a speaker’s assertion without assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness; 
however, she does not exclude the necessity of assessing a speaker’s 
trustworthiness. According to her, a hearer’s attitude toward the speaker 
should be critical, and he/she must assess the speaker’s trustworthiness 
depending on each situation. Therefore, Fricker’s concept of the 




3.10 Hume and Fricker  
Is there an agreement or disagreement between Hume’s and Fricker’s 
concepts of reductionism? Both Fricker and Hume accept that sometimes in 
order to accept the speaker’s assertion, the hearer needs to assess the 
speaker’s assertion, and sometimes we accept the speaker’s asser tion without 
assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness. Nevertheless, both of them explain 
their positions differently. Hume suggested that because of our customs or 
habits, the hearer accepts a speaker’s assertion, without any assessment. 
Similarly, Fricker indicates that according to the commonsense person 
theory, the hearer accepts some of the speaker’s assertions without any 
assessment. Therefore, it can be concluded that the intention of both Hume’s 
and Fricker’s explanations regarding the acceptance of the speaker’s 
assertion without any assessment, is the same; both explain the instances of 
assertions, which we generally accept without assessing the speaker’s 
trustworthiness, within the reductionist framework.  
One might say that difference between them is that Fricker explains a 
stage of language learning process when people accept the speaker’s 
assertion without assessing the speaker’s trustworthiness, which she called 
the “simple trust” stage. Hume does not discuss any such stage. Should we 
conclude that Hume does not accept the “simple trust” stage?  I do not think 
so. If we consider the interpretation of Hume’s concept of testimony as 
provided by Welbourne (2002, 414–415), then it is similar to Fricker’s 
concept. According to Welbourne, when Hume states that human testimony 
depends on the experience of a constant and regular association between 
testimony and reality, then the basic language learning process of a child or 
a new learner because when a young human child learns a language, he/she 
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learns it from his/her parents or other family members. If we consider the 
learning process of a child or a new learner, then we realize that children or 
new learners accept the assertion of their parents or others without assessing 
trustworthiness. For example, when a child’s parents assert that “this is a 
book” and point toward a certain object, then the child accepts his/her 
parents assertion without assessing their trustworthiness. Therefore, during 
the initial learning process of a child or any new learner, Hume accepts the 
“simple trust” stage as explained by Fricker. However, Hume does not 
explicitly explain it. We have to deduce it from his writing as we extracted 
his concept of testimony.  
Conclusion of the present chapter is that both Hume and Fricker 







Previously I discussed the reductionist account of testimony, 
particularly Hume’s and Fricker’s reductionist concepts of testimony, in 
detail. In the next two chapters, I discuss, in detail, the anti -reductionist 
account of testimony, particularly highlighting the works of Tyler Burge, 
and Jennifer Lackey. 
 
4.2 Burge’s Anti-Reductionism 
Before discussing Burge and Lackey’s anti-reductionist theories of 
testimony in detail, let me recapitulate the main anti-reductionist claims. 
According to anti-reductionism, testimony is a basic source of knowledge, 
like perception, memory, and inference. The hearer is entitled to believe the 
speaker’s assertion unless he/she has a strong or relevant reason not to 
believe it, or he/she has a defeater. However, what is the reason for believing 
the speaker’s assertion when the hearer has no strong or relevant reason to 
reject it? To answer this question, Burge presents his acceptance principle of 
the epistemology of testimony in the following way:  
“Acceptance Principle: A person is entitled to accept as true 
something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to 
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him, unless there are strong reasons not to do so.” (Burge  
1993, 467) 
According to Burge, sometimes we do not have reasons to reject what 
is told by others. For example, suppose my friend John tells me that he 
attended a conference organized by Harvard University last month and talked 
with Prof. Hilary Putnam about his recent work. In this situation, I do not 
have any reason or sign to reject John’s assertion, therefore, I accept it. 
However, if I had any information that contradicts John’s assertion, such as 
the information that Prof. Hilary Putnam was in the Uni ted Kingdom during 
the last month, I would not accept John’s assertion. Therefore, Burge 
concludes that the hearer accepts the speaker’s assertion unless he/she has a 
strong reason not to do so. 
Burge points out that those who do not accept the acceptance 
principle, presuppose that a person is justified in believing any assertion that 
p only when he/she has a positive reason or justification in favor of the 
source from which he/she acquired the belief that p.
45
 For example, John told 
me that tomorrow our university will be closed because of some unavoidable 
reasons. Now, those who reject the acceptance principle, claim that I am 
justified in believing John’s assertion if I am justified in believing that John 
believes that our university will be closed tomorrow, and he is justified in 
believing it. However, Burge does not accept this view. According to Burge, 
there is a difference between “justified in believing that p” and “justified in 
                                                 
45
 “It is usually said that to e justified in accepting information from someone else, 
one must be justified in believing that the source believes the information and is 
justified in believing it.” (Burge 1993, 468)  
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believing the source from which we acquired that p”. The first level of 
justification concerns p, whereas the second level of justification concerns 
the source of the belief that p. People, in general, assume that the 
justification of the source of the belief that p is the justification of p. When 
one has a justification for believing the source of the belief that p, only then 
he/she can rightly claim that he/she justified in believing that p (Burge 1993, 
468). Therefore, Burge suggests that people in general think that the 
justification in believing that p is derived from the justification of the source 
of the belief that p. However, Burge does not accept this. According to 
Burge, one is entitled to be justified in believing that p on the basis of the 
speaker’s assertion, when he/she has no reasons to reject that p, without 
addressing the issues of whether or not the speaker believes that p and 
whether or not the speaker is justified in believing that p.
46
 
The next question is why a hearer accepts a speaker’s assertion 
without considering the speaker’s sincerity when he/she has no reason to 
reject the speaker’s assertion. To answer this question, Burge argues that 
although the speaker may have every reason to lie, human beings tend to tell 
the truth. Therefore, Burge expresses his deep faith in a truth-telling norm 
and suggests that human beings generally comply with the truth-telling 
norm.
47
 Based on the truth-telling norm, Burge argues that the hearer is 
                                                 
46
 “A presupposition of the Acceptance Principle is that one i s entitled not to bring 
one’s source’s sincerity or justification into question, in the absence of reason to 
the contrary. This too is an epistemic default position.” (Burge 1993, 468)  
47
 “We can acquire empirical reasons not to accept what we are told: “he  has every 
reason to lie.” But to be entitled, we do not have to have reasons that support the 
default position, if there is no reasonable ground for doubt. Truth telling is a norm 
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entitled to accept, without any empirical grounds, the assertion of the 
speaker unless he/she has a strong reason to reject it. Therefore, the 
acceptance principle provides apriori justification for the speaker’s 
assertion. According to Burge, the general form of justification associated 
with this principle is as follows: 
“The general form of justification associated with the 
principle is: A person is apriori entitled to accept a 
proposition that is presented as true and that is intelligible to 
him, unless there are strong reasons not to do so, because it 
is prima facie preserved (received) from a rational source, or 
resource of reason; reliance on rational sources or resources 
for reason – is, other thing equal, necessary to the function 
of reason.” (Burge 1993, 469)  
The hearer is apriori entitled to accept the speaker’s assertion when 
the speaker presents his/her assertion as true, and the hearer has no reason to 
reject it, because the speaker is a rational being, and every rational being 
tells the truth under normal circumstances. Therefore, Burge formulates the 
acceptance principle on the basis of the hypothesis that rational beings are 
subject to a truth-telling norm.
48
 Under normal circumstances, the hearer is 
entitled to accept the speaker’s assertion without any additional empirical 
                                                                                                                                          
that can be reasonably presumed in the absence of reasons to attribute viol ations.” 
(Burge 1993, 468)  
48
 “One has a general entitlement to rely on the rationality of rat ional being.” 
(Burge 1993, 469) 
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evidence, unless he/she has any strong reason which proves that the speaker 
is violating the rational truth-telling norm.  
From the aforementioned discussion we may conclude that Burge 
considers the speaker’s assertion as a rational source because it is presented 
by a rational being. He argues that “one has a general entitlement to rely on 
the rationality of a rational being” (Burge 1993, 469). However, one may 
question why Burge considers the speaker’s assertion as a rational source. Is 
it merely because the speaker is a human being and knows language? Burge 
argues that we all consider ourselves as rational beings, and we instinctively 
presume that our source is rational. Burge suggests that, intelligibility is a 
sign of rationality. Therefore, we may consider a speaker’s assertion as a 
rational source when the assertion is understandable or intelligible  to us. 
Thus, rationality depends on understanding the speaker’s language (Burge 
1993, 471). Note further that for Burge “rational sources are sources that 
themselves are a capacity to reason or are rational being (Burge 1993, 470).” 
The speaker’s assertion is a rational source, because the speaker’s assertions 
itself is a reason which shows that we are apriori entitled to rely on the 
speaker’s assertion.    
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of the violation of the 
“truth-telling norm” because the speaker may have a reason (either good or 
bad) to lie. Yet, according to Burge, the “truth-telling norm” provides 
grounds for believing the assertion of the speaker.
49
 Burge further argues 
                                                 
49
 “one can ask why one is entitled to rely on rational sources (or resources for 




that the speaker’s assertion is a rational source, and a rational source should 
be counted as a prima facie source of the truth. When a speaker S asserts that 
p to a hearer H, then H is entitled to accept that p as true because p is prima 
facie rationally supported (Burge 1993, 470–471). Although, it is true that 
rational mistakes are possible, but unless there is reason to think that such 
mistakes have occurred, it is rational for the hearer to accept the speaker’s 
assertion.
50
   
However, the acceptance principle does not guarantee the truth of the 
speaker’s assertion,51 because the “truth-telling norm” does not ensure that 
the speaker always tells the truth. Although, despite the possibility that the 
speaker makes a false assertion, the hearer is apriori entitled to accept the 
speaker’s assertion, unless he/she has some reason to reject it. Therefore, the 
hearer is likely to be apriori prima facie entitled to accept a false assertion.
52
 
For example, suppose John and Peter work in the same office, and they are 
good friends. However, just for fun, John informs Peter on Saturday night 
that the office will be closed next Monday. According to the acceptance 
principle, Peter is entitled to accept John’s assertion without empirical 
evidence if he does not have a strong reason to reject it. Suppose Peter does 
not have a reason to reject John’s assertion, so, he becomes apriori entitled 
                                                 
50
 “Rational mistakes are possible. But if there is no reason to think that they are 
occurring, it is rational to accept the affirmed deliverances of a rational source.” 
(Burge 1993, 471) 
51
 “The apriori entitlement described by the Acceptance Principle is, of course, no 
guarantee of truth.” (Burge 1993, 476) 
52
 “We could be apriori entitled to false beliefs.” (Burge 1993, 473)  
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to accept Peter’s assertion, which is indeed false. Therefore, one may be 
apriori entitled to accept a false assertion on the basis of the acceptance 
principle (Burge 1993, 473, 476). However, in everyday life we may find 
that people are surprisingly irrational in certain cases, and have deeply 
irrational tendencies. Therefore, one cannot be apriori entitled to accept what 
is told by the other without considering whether the person is lying.  
  To address the issue of whether the assertion is true or false, Burge 
argues in two ways: First, he explains why “truth telling” is the norm for a 
rational being. According to Burge, to understand why “truth telling” is a 
norm, we have to understand the primary function of reason. The primary 
function of reason is to present the truth, independent of personal interest 
and benefit. Although, sometimes lying becomes rational and intelligible for 
a person when it fulfills his/her purpose and secures his/her interest, lying 
occasionally is not consistent with the function of reason. It conflicts with 
the “transpersonal function of presenting the truth, independently of special 
personal interest (Burge 1993, 475)” which is characteristic of reason. 
Therefore, lying is not natural for a rational being.
53
  
Second, when someone argues that people are irrational in some 
respect, they are focusing on the actual function of reason. Reason does not 
function only to serve the interest of an individual. The primary function of 
reason is to promote the truth without considering the personal interests of 
an individual. Another key consideration is that our practice of 
                                                 
53
 “(Compare: lying for the fun of it is a form of craziness.)” (Burge 1993, 474)  
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communication depends on the truth-preservative norm.
54
 Therefore, when a 
rational speaker presents intelligible contents as true, the hearer can 
rationally presume that the speaker’s intention of successful communication 
has been fulfilled; therefore, the speaker is presenting the truth. Therefore, 
when any rational being presents intelligible content to someone as true, the  
person requires a particular reason to think that there has been a deviation 
from the rational truth-presentation norms. Thus, the person is apriori 
entitled to accept the contents as true unless he/she has a strong reason to 
counter it (Burge 1993, 475–476).     
Burge overcomes the problem of the possibility of lying by saying 
that rational people generally do not lie and that “lying for the fun of it is a 
form of craziness (Burge 1993, 474)” . Yet he cannot exclude the possibility 
that the speaker has false beliefs, expresses them to a hearer through an 
assertion, and the hearer does not have any reason to reject the speaker’s 
assertion. In this case, according to the acceptance principle, the hearer is 
apriori entitled to accept the speaker’s false assertion. For example, suppose 
John formed the belief that there is a dog in the garden on seeing a cat and 
reports his belief to Peter. In the present situation, Peter has no reason to 
counter John’s assertion. Therefore, according to the acceptance principle, 
Peter is apriori entitled to accept John’s assertion. However, John’s assertion 
is false. Therefore, according to the acceptance principle, the hearer may be 
apriori entitled to accept a false assertion.    
                                                 
54
 “Lying is sometimes rational in the sense that it is in the liar’s best interests. But 
lying occasions a disunity among functions of reason. it conflicts with one’s 
reason’s transpersonal function of presenting the truth, independently of special 
personal interests.” (Burge 1993, 475) 
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The next question concerns whether Burge denied any role of 
empirical elements in the entitlement process when he argued in favor of 
apriori entitlement of the speaker’s assertion on the basis of the acceptance 
principle. To answer this question, Burge argues that, although the 
acceptance principle is not an empirical principle, its application, inevitably, 
depends on empirical elements.
55
 The hearer always depends on perception 
to know what is told by the others. For example, if a person wants to know 
the sentence uttered by another, he/she must hear it,  whereas if he/she wants 
to know a written statement, he/she must read it. Therefore, to know 
anything told by another, one has to depend on perception.
56
 However, at the 
same time, Burge argues that although perception assists in the minimal 
understanding of the language, it does not assist in determining the 
justification or entitlement of the language. We do not perceive the content 
of the speaker’s assertion, we understand it. We perceive the words in the 
speaker’s assertion (Burge 1993, 476, 478).  
One might argue that when we perceive the words in the speaker’s 
assertion, we can infer the content of the speaker’s assertion, which entitles 
us to accept the speaker’s assertion. Therefore, entitlement to accept the 
speaker’s assertion is derived from the perception of the words and 
understanding them, and it is not apriori entitlement.  
                                                 
55
 “In interlocution, we are also causally dependent on perception. Our entitlements 
are thus dependent on perception. But in my view, perception contributes nothing 
to the epistemic force of the fundamental “default” entitlement.” (Burge  1993, 478) 
56
 “Perception is necessary to minimal understanding; and minimal understanding is 
essential to belief and justification.” (Burge 1993, 476)  
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However, Burge argues that we hear the speaker’s words and 
understand their meaning from which we can gain the “putative truth.” In 
some sense we causally depend on perception; therefore, our entitlements 
somehow depend on perception. However, “perception contributes nothing to 
the epistemic force of the fundamental ‘default’ entitlement.” (Burge 1993, 
478) We may infer the subject matter and content by perceiving the words 
occurring in the speaker’s assertion but association among the words  is 
beyond our perception. Our primary entitlement of the speaker’s assertion is 
derived from this prima facie understanding of the speaker’s assertion, not 
from perception.
57
 To obtain a prima facie understanding of the speaker’s 
assertion, we are necessarily dependent on perception, but the entitlement of 
the speaker’s assertion does not depend on perception. Therefore, the 




From the aforementioned discussion, we may summarize Burge’s 
concept of testimony as follows: 
The hearer is apriori entitled to accept the speaker’s assertion unless 
he/she has a strong reason to counter it because the hearer considers the 
speaker as a rational being and his/her assertion as the source of reason, on 
the basis of the intelligibility of the speaker’s assertion. As per the rational 
                                                 
57
 “. . . . . . the fundamental entitlement to accept something as presentation -as-true 
derives from understanding . . . . . . . The justificational force of the derivation 
does not depend on any supplementation from perception.”  (Burge 1993, 483)  
58
 “The justificational force of the entitlement to rely on the connection is 
correspondingly conceptual, not perceptual .” (Burge 1993, 482)  
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norm, a rational being should assert something which he/she actually 
believes to be true, that is, the content of his/her knowledge must be 
preserved in his/her presentation. Burge calls it the “truth telling norm”. 
Therefore, when the speaker asserts something to the hearer, he/she should 
present what he/she believes to be true, and depending on the speaker’s 
assertion, the hearer is entitled to accept it unless he/she has a strong reason 
to reject it. Finally, entitlement is apriori, and not empirical. Although, we 
are depend on perception for a minimal understanding of the speaker’s 
assertion. From the perception of the words of the speaker’s assertion, we 
understand their meaning and from this understanding, we derive the 
entitlement to accept the speaker’s assertion. In the hypothesis that the 
understanding of the association between words and their content is purely 
internal, the entitlement to accept the speaker’s assertion does not depend on 
any empirical supplements; thus, this entitlement is purely apriori.  
At this point we can also understand in what sense Burge’s theory of 
testimony is anti-reductionist. Again, he argues that the hearer is entitled to 
accept the speaker’s assertion without any empirical grounds, unless he/she 






5.1 Lackey’s Concept of Anti-Reductionism 
I stressed that for Burge the absence of a strong reason to reject the 
speaker’s assertion, or the absence of a defeater is the fundamental ground or 
justification to accept any speaker’s assertion. Lackey does not agree with 
this point – she argues that the absence of a defeater is not sufficient for the 
hearer to accept the speaker’s assertion.  She contends that Burge’s version 
of anti-reductionism does not guarantee testimonial knowledge.  According to 
Lackey, in addition to the absence of a defeater or reason to reject the 
speaker’s assertion, we need at least three additional conditions to make 
anti-reductionism plausible to us. Here, I present Lackey’s formulation of 
anti-reductionism. 
Lackey initially formulates anti-reductionism with respect of 
testimonial knowledge (TKN) in the following way:  
“(TKN): For every speaker A and hearer B, B knows that p 
on the basis of A’s testimony that p if and only if: (1) B 
believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony 
that p, (2) p is true, and (3) B has no defeaters for A’s 
testimony that p.” (Lackey 2003, 707)  
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Therefore, a knower K can gain testimonial knowledge that p from the 
testimony of another person S if and only if K believes that p on the basis of 
S’s testimony (which is true in nature), so K’s belief that p is true and K has 
no defeaters for S’s testimony that p. According to Lackey, the primary 
focus of this formulation of anti-reductionism with respect to testimonial 
knowledge lies on the “defeater condition”. When the knower has any 
defeaters against a testimony, the knower is not in a position to know 
anything from that testimony. However, if the knower does not have any 
defeaters against a testimony, the knower is in a position to know something 
from that testimony.  
 
5.2 Classification of Defeaters   
The next question concerns the nature of defeaters.
59
 According to 
Lackey there are defeaters of three kinds. The first is doxastic defeater and 
she introduces it as follows. When a subject S believes a proposition p as  
true and S’s belief that p indicates that his/her belief that q (acquired on the 
basis of testimony of others) is either false or unreliable then S’s belief that 
p is considered a defeater of q. However, it may be possible that S’s belief 
that p is false. For example, suppose John believes that Peter is in London. 
However, one of Peter’s friends tells John that Peter is in Paris and John 
believes Peter’s friend’s assertion. Now, John’s new belief that Peter is in 
Paris defeated his belief that Peter is in London. Sometimes, John’s old 
                                                 
59
 Previously in Chapter Two I discussed about Defeaters in a general way.  
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belief prevents his acquisition of a new belief. Moreover, the assertion of 
Peter’s friend may be false. Therefore, regardless of the truth -value of 
John’s belief that Peter is in Paris, it prevents John’s belief that Peter is  in 
London. Defeaters, in this sense, function by the virtue of being believed. 
This is why Lackey calls them doxastic defeaters (Lackey 2003, 707).
60
   
The second type of defeater is normative defeater. When a subject S 
is justified in believing that p and his /her belief that p prevents him/her 
from believing that q on the basis of the testimony of others, S’s belief that p 
is a defeater of q. Here, S prevents himself/herself from believing that q, 
because S is justified in believing that p and this belief prevents him/her 
from doing so. Defeaters in this sense do not function by the virtue of being 
believed, they function by virtue of their being justified belief (Lackey 1999, 
475; 2003, 707).  
The third type of defeaters is factual defeaters. When a true 
proposition p is added to the subject S’s belief system and prevents him/her 
from believing that q, then the proposition p is a factual defeater. Defeaters 
in this sense function by virtue of the truth (Lackey 1999, 475).   
Given the three types of defeaters, TKN says that the presence of any 
of them prevents the subject from gaining any knowledge from the speaker’s 
                                                 
60
 “.....defeater is a proposition D that is believed by S to be true, yet indicates that 
S’s belief that p is either false or unreliable formed or sustained. Defeaters in this 
sense function by virtue of being believed, regardless of their truth-value.” (Lackey 
1999, 474; 2003, 707) 
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testimony. These defeaters may either be defeated or undefeated defeater 
(the defeated defeater and undefeated defeater were discussed in Chapter 
Two). Therefore, the third condition of TKN should be reformulated as 
follows: “(3*) B has no undefeated defeaters for A’s testimony that p”. 61 The 
reason is that only undefeated defeaters can prevent the subject from 
justifiably believing what is told by the others.  
One acknowledged the possibility of three types of defeaters,  Lackey 
remarks that neither the original TKN formulation of anti-reductionism nor 
the TKN with (3*) define testimonial knowledge. Therefore, Lackey 
suggests that in addition to the TKN formulation, we have to include three 
more conditions, without which, the TKN formulation of anti-reductionism 
does not fulfill its purpose.  
Before discussing the additional conditions for the anti -reductionists 
formulation of TKN, we should keep in mind that despite the fact that we are 
in the post-Gettier era of epistemology, Lackey follows the JTB (justified 
true belief) formulation of knowledge for this discussion. The schematic 
formulation of the definition of knowledge according to the JTB thes is is as 
follows: 
                                                 
61
 “It is the presence of undefeated defeaters, not defeaters, that is incompatible 
with testimonial knowledge. Condition (3) in (TKN) should, therefore, be read 
accordingly.” (Lackey 2003708)  
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“K. S knows that p iff (i) p; (ii) S believes that p; (iii) S is 
justified in believing that p.” (Lackey 1999, 473; Gettier 
1963, 121) 
Thus, a subject S can legitimately argue that he knows that p on the 
basis of the testimony of others that p, if and only if p is true, and S believes 
that p and S is justified in believing that p by the testimony of others.  
According to Lackey, the present TKN formulation of anti -
reductionism does reproduce the structure of K and more conditions are 
required, namely (1) a necessary condition for the speaker, (2) a necessary 
condition for the hearer, and (3) a necessary condition for the environment. I 
shall now analyze the three conditions.  
 
5.3 A Necessary Condition for the Speaker  
According to Lackey, when a speaker S believes that p, p is true, but 
S’s belief that p does not appropriately connect with the fact, if S asserts that 
p to a hearer H, H is not able to gain any knowledge from S’s assertion that 
p. Yet, H fulfills TKN conditions. Lackey presents the following Case #1.  
“Case #1: Margaret is an extremely incompetent epistemic 
agent, continually forming perceptual beliefs without 
wearing her required prescription eyeglasses, testimonial 
beliefs on the basis of reading the National Enquirer, 
introspective beliefs when she is intoxicated, and so on. One 
day, Margaret again fails to wear her corrective lenses and 
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forms the belief that there is a great horned owl in a tree 50 
feet away. Her belief happens to be true. Later that day, 
Margaret meets someone on the street named Eleanor, 
reports her owl sighting to her, and Eleanor comes to believe 
that there was a great horned owl in neighborhood tree on 
the basis of Margaret’s testimony. Moreover, since it is 
possible for great horned owl to be in this neighborhood and 
Eleanor knows nothing about Margaret’s epistemic habits, 
there are undefeated defeaters for the report in question, that 
is, Eleanor neither believes nor has evidence available to her 
such that she should believe that Margaret’s report is false 
or unreliable.” (Lackey 2003, 708)  
Here, Margaret’s belief that there is a great horned owl in the 
neighborhood tree is true but her belief is not a justified true belief, because 
she did not wear her corrective lenses when she formed this belief. 
Therefore, her belief is accidentally connected with the presence of the owl 
and she is not justified in believing it (similar arguments are presented in 
other work by Lackey. [Lackey 1999, 477; 2006, 434]). When she reports 
her belief to another person, Eleanor, without mentioning the fact that she 
(Margaret) did not wear her corrective lenses when she formed her belief, 
Eleanor believes that there is a great horned owl in the neighborhood tree on 
the basis of the content of Margaret’s testimony. Her belief is true and she 
has no undefeated defeaters against Margaret’s testimony, therefore, 
according to the TKN formulation of anti-reductionism, Eleanor knows that 
there is a great horned owl in the neighborhood tree.  However, since we are 
in the post Gettier era, we know that in the present circumstances Eleanor 
does not know that there is a great horned owl in the neighborhood tree, 
 108 
 
although all three conditions of TKN are satisfied, because, Margaret’s 
testimony, from which she formed her belief, failed to appropriately connect 
with the relevant fact. In the post-Gettier era, when a person A claims that 
he/she knows that p, A’s belief that p should be appropriately, and not 
accidentally or unreliably, connected with the fact  that p.  
Thus, Lackey suggests that we have to modify the second condition of 
TKN, as follows: 
“(2*) For every speaker A and hearer B, if B comes to know 
that p on the basis of A’s testifying that p, then A must know 
that p.” (Lackey 2003, 709)  
The presupposition of testimonial knowledge of p is that the testifier 
must know that p. Unless the testifier fulfills this condition, the hearer is not 
in a position to know anything from his/her testimony.  Knowledge requires 
some non-accidental or reliable connection between the knower’s belief and 
the known fact. Therefore, when a speaker S asserts that p on the basis of 
his/her knowledge, and not on the basis of mere belief, there must be some 
non-accidental or reliable connections between his/her belief that p and the 
fact that p. Now, if the speaker S asserts that p on the basis his/her 
knowledge, that is, S’s epistemic status corresponds with S’s report, the 
hearer H knows that p on the basis of S’s testimony that p.  
However, according to Lackey, condition (2*) is too strong for 
testimonial knowledge. Suppose a subject, by mistake, believes that his/her 
faculty of senses is not functioning properly. In the present circumstances, 
he/she considers his/her empirical beliefs false. However, his/her beliefs are 
non-accidentally connected with the facts, irrespective of his/her belief. Yet, 
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his/her empirical beliefs are not knowledge. Now, if he/she reports what 
he/she believes to another person, who does not have any information about 
the speaker’s belief, that his/her faculty of sense was not working properly 
(which is actually false), and he/she has no independent reason to think that 
the speaker is incompetent or insincere with respect to his/her report, what 
would happen to the hearer? Would he/she gain any knowledge from the 
speaker’s testimony? Lackey contends that the hearer will gain knowledge 
from the speaker’s assertion. Lackey presents this argument in Case #2 
(Lackey 2003, 710; 2006, 435) as follows:  
“Case #2: Florence is incorrectly told by an otherwise highly 
competent optometrist that her vision is nearly completely 
unreliable, and, though she accepts his diagnosis, she 
continues to rely on her faculty of vision to form perceptual 
beliefs. Upon leaving her doctor’s office, Florence sees a car 
accident, forms the corresponding belief, and later reports 
her belief to Alice without mentioning the optometrist’s 
report. Since Alice is unaware of Florence’s recent diagnosis 
and has no independent reason to think that Florence is 
either incompetent or insincere with respect to this 
information, she readily accepts her testimony about car 
accident.” (Lackey 2003, 710)  
Here, Florence does not accept what she perceived outside the 
doctor’s office. She has a defeater for her visual beliefs, namely the 
competent optometrist’s diagnosis. However, the defeater for her visual 
beliefs was not conveyed (transmitted) through her testimony and she did not 
mention it while she reported what she perceived outside the doctor’s office. 
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Therefore, Alice is entitled to accept Florence’s testimony, and she (Alice) 
has no defeaters against it, despite the fact that Florence did not fulfill 
condition (2*).  
The counterexample suggests that we should reformulate (2*) 
condition as follows: 
(2**) For every speaker A and hearer B, B comes to know 
that p on the basis of A’s testifying that p, only if A’s 
testimony that p is appropriately connected with the fact.    
On the basis of (2**), Lackey formulates anti-reductionism as 
follows: 
“(TKN*): For every speaker A and hearer B, B knows that p 
on the basis of A’s testimony that p if and only if: (1) B 
believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony 
that p, (2**) A’s testimony that p is appropriately connected 
with the fact that p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters 
for A’s testimony that p.” (Lackey 2003, 710)  
Here, by adding condition (2**), which stresses the role of an 
appropriate connection between the speaker’s testimony that p and the fact 
that p, Lackey ensures the truth condition of knowledge (originally presented 
by condition (2) in the TKN formulation of anti-reductionism).
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5.4 A Necessary Condition for the Hearer 
The TKN* formulation of anti-reductionism satisfies all the 
conditions of K. Yet, TKN* is not an adequate account of the anti-
reductionist concept of testimony, because it does not mention any condition 
concerning the hearer. Consider the case in which the hearer is extremely 
good natured and rarely doubts the sincerity of the speaker, even when 
he/she has sufficient evidence for doubt. Such a hearer is not sufficiently 
sincere to find undefeated defeaters for the speaker’s testimony. In this 
circumstance, the hearer may accept a testimony that he/she might have 
rejected if he/she were more sincere with regard to the speaker’s testimony. 
Lackey discusses this possibility in her Case #3 (Lackey 2003, 711; 2006, 
436), in which there is an extremely innocent and good natured hearer, who 
is incapable of thinking that someone is insincere, dishonest, and wants to 
deceive others. In fact this person always thinks highly of other people. 
Therefore, when he receives any testimony from others he accepts it 
immediately, even if he has massive evidence that the speaker is an 
unreliable epistemic agent (e.g. the speaker does not know what he/she is 
presenting, and he/she is not a reliable testifier).  
                                                                                                                                          
“SVT: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B’s belief that p is known (justified, 
warranted) on the basis of A’s testimony that p only if (1) A’s statement that p is 
reliable or otherwise truth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p on the basis of 
the content of A’s statement that p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for 
believing that p.” (Lackey 2006, 438)  
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According to Lackey, such a hearer does not know anything from the 
speaker’s testimony despite the fact that he/she satisfies all the conditions of 
TKN*, because the manner in which the hearer satisfies condition (3) of 
TKN* is inadequate for testimonial knowledge. To explain this, Lackey 
differentiates between substantive and trivial satisfaction of the no-defeater 
condition of TKN*. In the aforementioned example, the hearer is incapable 
of being sensitive and critical to the presence of defeaters. His behavior is 
not the behavior of a sincere epistemic agent; rather he behaves like he/she 
was programed to accept any testimony from any speaker. Therefore, if he 
accepts any testimony under the condition that he has no undefeated 
defeaters for the speaker’s testimony, he overlooks massive counterevidence 
and presents himself as the programed hearer who is eager to accept the 
speaker’s testimony under any circumstance. Therefore, the hearer trivially 
satisfies the no-defeater condition of TKN*. On the contrary, if the hearer 
has the capacity to be sensitive and critical toward the speaker’s testimony 
and considers every counterevidence, we can say that the hearer 
substantively satisfies the no-defeater condition. According to Lackey, in 
order to know something from the speaker’s testimony the hearer has to 
satisfy the no-defeater condition substantively, not trivially.  
Yet, even the substantive satisfaction of the no-defeater condition of 
TKN* is not enough. Consider someone who is over sensitive or 
inappropriately sensitive to defeaters, as described in the following Case #4 
(Lackey 2003, 712). Here we have someone who has some evidence that a 
few of his neighbors have lied to him in the past, from which he concludes 
that everyone in his neighborhood is constantly trying to deceive him. 
However, he is also certain that the neighbors know that he is suspicious of 
them. Therefore, he concludes that his neighbors intend to deceive him, and 
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they know that he does not believe them, so, everyone will report what they 
believe under the assumption that he will believe the opposite. In the present 
circumstances, suppose one of his neighbors N, whom he has no good 
epistemic reason to distrust, tells him that p, then after receiving the 
neighbor’s testimony that p, he concludes that “N wants to deceive me, but 
N knows that I am suspicious of him, so he reported to me that p, believing 
that I will disbelieve what he says. But I know his strategy and will not let 
him succeed in his plan. Therefore, I will believe his assertion that p.” In the 
present circumstance, his neighbor’s testimony is, in fact, true. He does not 
believe that his neighbor’s testimony is false or unreliable, and he does not 
have any evidence to believe so. We have to accept that the person knows 
that p, because he satisfies TKN* and is being sensitive to defeaters. 
However, this person is not able to know that p on the basis of his 
neighbor’s testimony that p. Though he satisfies conditions (1 and 2**) and 
substantively also satisfies condition (3) of TKN*, he is inappropriately 
sensitive to defeaters. Contrary to Case #3, the person in Case #4 
substantively satisfies condition (3) of TKN*, but he does it irrationally and 
inappropriately. Therefore, he is not able to gain testimonial knowledge on 
the basis of his neighbor’s testimony.  
Lackey’s conclusion is that in order to gain testimonial knowledge on 
the basis of the speaker’s testimony, the hearer should be a properly 
functioning or reliable recipient of that testimony, and he/she should be 
appropriately sensitive to defeaters. On the basis of this condition, Lackey 
reformulates anti-reductionism in the following way:  
“(TKN**): For every speaker A and hearer B, B knows that 
p on the basis of A’s testimony that p if and only if: (1) B 
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believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony 
that p, (2**) A’s testimony that p is appropriately connected 
with the fact that p, (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for 
A’s testimony that p, and (4) B is reliable or properly 
functioning recipient of testimony.” (Lackey 2003,  714) 
In this formulation of anti-reductionism, Lackey overcomes the 
insincerity or insensitivity of the hearer to defeaters to gain testimonial 
knowledge. However, this is not yet the end.  
 
5.5 A Necessary condition for the Environment 
Lackey contends that we need additional conditions over and above 
(2**) and (4) to establish the acceptability of anti-reductionism. When anti-
reductionists claim that testimony is a source of knowledge in so far as to 
argue that the speaker or testifier reliably presents a testimony that is 
connected with facts and the hearer is sensitive to defeater or is a properly 
functioning recipient, they have actually missed a crucial aspect of 
epistemology of testimony, that is, the necessary condition for the 
environment. Lackey discusses this in Case # 5 (Lackey 2003, 714 – 715).   
Suppose that person S asks something to a person H, who is the only 
exceptional person with respect to the epistemic nature of his community, 
consists of people who are generally unreliable for an “outsider,” and S 
receives a true and reliable answer from H. Suppose furthermore, that S is 
sensitive to defeaters and he/she has no evidence against H’s testimony. Can 
S claim that he knows something from H’s testimony?   
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If we analyze the circumstances, we find that the circumstances 
satisfy the TKN** formulation of anti-reductionism. First, whatever S 
believes is on the basis of the content of H’s testimony. Therefore, S 
satisfies condition (1) of TKN**. Second, H’s testimony represents the fact. 
Therefore, H’s testimony is appropriately connected with the fact and 
satisfies condition (2) of TKN**. Third, S has no evidence against H’s 
testimony that proves that it is false or unreliable. Therefore, S satisfies 
condition (3) of TKN**. Finally, S is sensitive to defeaters, therefore S is a 
reliable or properly functioning recipient of the testimony as condition (4) of 
TKN** claimed.  
However, according to Lackey, despite the fact that  the aforesaid 
circumstances satisfy conditions (1) to (4) of TKN**, S does not know 
anything from H’s testimony, because the satisfaction of conditions (1) to 
(4) of (TKN**) depends on S’s good fortune. If he asked anyone other than 
H, he would certainly receive false information. According to Lackey, we 
can analyze this luck case in two ways. First, one may argue that what S 
believes on the basis of H’s testimony is merely an “accident that it is true 
rather than false” and thereby a Gettier-type case. Second, one may claim 
that what S believes on the basis of H’s testimony is merely  an “accident 
that it is justified rather than unjustified” and thereby, it differs from a 
standard Gettier-type case. In the latter case, accidentality is located at the 
level of justification rather than at the level of truth. Lackey suggests that 
whatever analysis we accept, it is true that S acquires a justified true belief 
in this environment by the virtue of good fortune. Thus another condition is 
required. Lackey reformulates anti-reductionism in the following way:  
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“(TKN***): For every speaker A and  hearer B, B knows that 
p on the basis of A’s testimony that p if and only if: (1) B 
believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony 
that p, (2**) A’s testimony that p is appropriately connected 
with the fact that p, (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for 
A’s testimony that p, (4) B is a reliable or properly 
functioning recipient of testimony, and (5) the environment 
in which B receives A’s testimony that p is suitable for the 
reception of reliable testimony.” (Lackey 2003, 716)  
Eventually, according to Lackey, this formulation (TKN***) of anti-
reductionism expresses the minimal requirement for the anti -reductionist 
account of testimonial knowledge. Further condition(s) may be required to 
make this formulation more acceptable.  
 
5.6 Argument Against Lackey’s Formulation of Testimony  
Lackey’s initial formulation of anti-reductionism, namely TKN, and 
her final formulation of anti-reductionism, namely TKN***, are based on the 
assumption that the speaker generally speaks the truth, which we can call 
truth presenting principle or content preservation principle. In the initial 
formulation of TKN, Lackey argues that when any speaker A asserts that p to 
a hearer B, B can gain knowledge on the basis of A’s testimony only if that p 
is true. This condition is one of the three conditions of TKN. Then, she 
argues that there might be a case where the speaker A asserts that p to the 
hearer B and A’s belief that p is true but fails to appropriately connect it 
with the truth (Lackey 2003, 709). To overcome this undesirable situation, 
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Lackey further modified condition (2), which is the truth condition to 
condition (2*). Lackey formulates (2*) in the following way:  
“(2*): For every speaker A and hearer B, if B comes to know 
that p on the basis of A’s testifying that p , then A must know 
that p.” (Lackey 2003, 709)  
By condition (2*) Lackey tries to ensure the truth condition. 
According to the post-Gettier formulation of the JTB theory of knowledge, 
when A knows that p, then A’s belief that p must be appropriately connect ed 
with the fact, not by luck.
63
  
Furthermore, Lackey argues that when a speaker A believes that p on 
the basis of visual perception but fails to know that p, because of wrong 
information of A’s physician (who is a highly competent optometrist) despite 
the fact that A’s belief that p is properly connected with the fact, and it is 
reported to the hearer B, according to (2*), B cannot know that p on the 
basis of A’s testimony that p, because condition (2*) is not satisfied here. To 
overcome this problem, Lackey reformulates (2*) as (2**). In (2**), Lackey 
argues that the hearer B is able to know that p on the basis of A’s testimony 
that p if A’s testimony that p appropriately connects with the fact that p.  
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 “Since it is post-Gettier knowledge that is at issue, it is widely accepted that, in 
order for a speaker A to know that p, there needs to be at least some non-accidental 




The question concerns how H knows that A’s belief that  p is 
appropriately connected with the fact(s) when (as Lackey argues) the hearer 
H’s knowledge that p on the basis of A’s testimony that p, depends on the 
appropriate connection between A’s belief that p and the fact that p. Here, I 
would like to recapitulate Lackey’s argument presented in Case #1, where 
the hearer falls to gain knowledge from speaker’s assertion, because A’s 
belief that p is not appropriately connected with the fact, though A’s belief 
that p is true. Now, one may argue, on behalf of Lackey that for gaining 
knowledge from speaker’s assertion, there is no need to know whether there 
is any appropriate connection between speaker’s beliefs that p and the fact 
that p. It is sufficient that an appropriate connection exists between 
speaker’s beliefs that p and the fact that p. This claim is very crucial for the 
epistemology of testimony. Let me explain this issue using two consecutive 
cases: 
Case #1: Suppose that John believes that there is a dog in 
the garden and his belief appropriately connected with the 
fact. Now, John asserts his belief to Peter. According to 
aforementioned claim, Peter can gain knowledge (if other 
conditions of the testimony are satisfied) from John’s 
assertion, because John’s belief is appropriately connected 
with fact. Note that, Peter does not verify whether or not 
John’s belief is appropriately connected with the fact.  
 
Case #2: Suppose John believes that there is a dog in the 
garden, but he does not know that his belief that there is a 
dog in the garden is not appropriately connected with the 
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fact. Suppose that he obtained his belief after seeing a cat. 
Now, according to the aforementioned view, if John asserts 
what he believes to Peter, Peter is not able to gain any 
knowledge from John’s assertion, even though the other 
conditions of the testimony are satisfied, because John’s 
belief that there is a dog in the garden is not appropriately 
connected with the fact.  
Now, my question is what makes the difference between Case #1 and 
Case #2? On what basis does Peter gain knowledge in the first case but not 
in the second case? One may argue that the difference depends on whether 
John’s belief is appropriately connected with the fact or not. John’s belief is 
appropriately connected with the fact in the first case but not second case. 
Therefore, Peter can obtain knowledge only in the first case.  
In the second case, John’s belief that there is a dog in the garden is 
not appropriately connected with the fact. My question is, “How does this 
prevent Peter from obtaining knowledge from John’s assertion when no one 
knows that John’s belief is not appropriately connected with the fact?” 
John’s assertion does not carry any sign or information that his belief is not 
appropriately connected with the fact. Then, how does it prevent Peter from 
obtaining knowledge on the basis of John’s assertion when other conditions 
are satisfied? Is there any additional information, in the second case, which 
prevents Peter from obtaining knowledge? Is there any mechanism through 
which Peter can know that the John’s belief that there is a dog in the garden 
is appropriately connected with the fact? Lackey is silent in this regard. I 
answer this question by considering other anti-reductionists and examining 
whether their arguments are acceptable or not.  
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To answer the aforementioned questions, one may present Burge’s 
argument (Burge 1999, 474–474) of “truth-telling” norm. According to this 
norm, the function of reason is to present and promote the truth. Therefore, 
when A knows that p and his/her belief that p is properly connected with the 
fact that p, he/she should present that p to the hearer H. Therefore, when 
speaker A asserts that p to the hearer B, B can legitimately infer that A is 
presenting his/her knowledge independent of special personal interests.  
However, this answer give rise to other questions, such as “How do 
we know the “truth-telling norm” is being followed?” We can answer this 
question in two ways. First, one may argue that we know this by observation. 
In everyday life, we observe that human beings,  in general, speak the truth. 
Therefore, on the basis of this observation, we may formulate the “truth -
telling norm” or that the “function of reason is presenting and promoting the 
truth.” Second, one may argue that we know that the “truth -telling norm” or 
“truth presenting or promoting function of reason” is independent of sense 
experience or observation; therefore, this is the true function of reason.  
However, I think that this “truth telling” norm is not sufficient  and I 
shall now defend my claim on two grounds. Consider first the following case 
shows: 
Case #3: John is extremely incompetent in forming 
perceptual beliefs, because he has a sight problem, of which 
he is unaware. Now, John believes that there is a dog in the 
garden after seeing a cat. Furthermore, John asserts what he 
believes to Peter. Peter has no sign to distrust John and the 
other conditions of the testimony also satisfied. John asserts 
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what he actually believes as true; therefore, the “truth -
telling” condition is also satisfied.  
Here, Peter does not obtain knowledge from John’s assertion  despite 
the fact that truth telling norm of testimonial knowledge has been satisfied.  
The second reason for my claim that the truth telling norm is not 
sufficient is the following: 
Case #4: John holds a justified true believes that there is a 
dog in the garden and deliberately asserts that there is a cat 
in the garden to Peter. However, there is no cat in the 
garden. 
Now, in the present situation, does Peter obtain any knowledge from 
John’s assertion if the other conditions of the testimony have been satisfied? 
According to anti-reductionism, Peter is not able to obtain knowledge from 
John’s assertion, because John does not satisfy “truth-telling” norm. 
However, how does Peter know that John is not following “truth telling” 
norm? There is no mechanism in the anti-reductionist account of testimony 
to know whether or not the speaker is, indeed, following the “truth -telling” 
norm. The hearer has to depend on the faith that the speaker generally speaks 
the truth. Therefore, in the anti-reductionist account of testimony, the hearer 
can never be certain about the truth of his/her belief, which is one of the 
conditions of knowledge (according to JTB theory), obtained from the 
speaker’s assertion. On the contrary, if  anti-reductionists argue that the 
hearer does not need to be certain about the truth value of the belief obtained 
on the basis of speaker’s assertion, they have to explain how the hearer 
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obtains knowledge without any certainty about truth in the framework of the 
JTB theory of knowledge.
64
   
Therefore, I believe that, anti-reductionism fails in dealing with the 
testimony provided by someone whose belief that p is not appropriately 
connected with the fact. The anti-reductionist is unable to answer to this 
question: how does the hearer ensure that the speaker’s assertion is 
appropriately connected with the fact?  Since, sometimes we accept what is 
told by the others without any verification and act accordingly, despite  the 
possibility of error, the anti-reductionist formulation of testimony does not 
ensure the truth condition of knowledge.
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In general, we think that scientific and perceptual knowledge is more 
fundamental than other types of knowledge. However, it is true that 
sometimes we hesitate while obtaining some information through sense 
experience or scientific experiment. In the latter case, for example, when a 
scientist obtains any unexpected result from an experiment, he is likely to 
hesitate before accepting the result. He may be uncertain  about the result in 
spite of knowing that he followed the correct method in his experiment. I 
think he hesitates because the result is unexpected to him. Therefore, for his 
own satisfaction, he will repeat experiment, and if he obtains the same 
result, only then will he, doubtlessly, accept it. Similarly, if one sees an 
unexpected object or hears an unexpected sound, he/she hesitates to accept 
them. Similarly, with respect to testimony, sometimes we accept what is told 
by others; however, sometimes we hesitate to accept it, depending on the 
nature of the information. More generally, I think that whether one accepts 
or hesitates to accept any information obtained by any source of knowledge 
is not only depend on from which source he/she obtains such information. 
Sometimes, it depends on the situation and on the nature of information. 
Thus, the source is not sufficient for a subject to accept any information 




I discussed both reductionism and anti-reductionism. I think that both 
have limits, which I shall describe in the final chapter. My criticism is based 
on two claims, a psychological claim and an epistemological claim. I shall 
then present an alternative account of testimony which tries to overcome the 
opposition between reductionist and anti-reductionist account of testimony. 
One version of this account is defended by Lackey. I shall revise Lackey’s 
proposal and present my own account.  
Psychological claim: 
It is not true that every man immoral and has a strong intention to 
deceive others. At the same time, it is not true that every man is sufficient ly 
good as to never deceive other or that there is no possibility of deceiving 
others. Therefore, when a speaker says something to a hearer, there is a 
possibility that the speaker might deceive the hearer intentionally. Therefore, 
the hearer must be careful when he/she is going to accept speaker’s 
assertion.  
Epistemological claim: 
First, sometimes we obtain false beliefs through sense experience, 
inference or through any others sources of knowledge. Hence, it is possible 
that a person does not know something properly or that he/she believes 
something which is actually false.  
Second, it is possible that the hearer does not understand what the 
speaker intends to say. If the hearer does not understand the information 
speaker intends to convey. For example, S may tell his/her friend H that 
he/she is near the bank (by “bank” S means the riverside) and H understands 
“bank” as the place where we keep our money. Now, in the present situation, 
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H does not gain any knowledge from S’s assertion and S’s assertion does not 
serve its purpose.  
In the process of testimony, there are many chances of error. 
Therefore, my conclusion is that unlike both global reductionism and anti-
reductionism, verification or additional grounds for testimony are required, 
depending on the situation, subject matter of the testimony, effect of the 
testimony. After considering all those circumstances, sometimes we accept a 
testimony without searching for any additional grounds. Likewise, 
sometimes we do not accept some testimony without additional grounds even 
in the absence of strong reason or the complete absence of reason to not 
accept the testimony. Hence, we cannot accept as a general rule that the 
hearer must accept the speaker’s assertion after empirically verifying the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony (as the reductionists claim), or  
that the hearer must accept the speaker’s assertion unless he/she  has any 
reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony (as anti -
reductionists claim). The first claim (the hearer should always verify the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony before accepting it) is too general 
claim and is not practicable in everyday life. Therefore, epistemologists 
often argue in favor of local reductionism. With respect to the second claim 
(the hearer must accept the speaker’s assertion unless he/she has a reason to 
doubt it) we may legitimately ask what happens when the hearer has a reason 
to doubt the speaker’s assertion. Anti-reductionists do not focus on this 
aspect. If the anti-reductionists answer to this question is that the hearer 
must verify the speaker’s assertion , then there will be no difference between 
them and reductionists. If the anti-reductionists do not give this answer, then 
they have to provide another one. I have not found any.  
I believe that both local reductionists and anti-reductionists try to 
explain the same facts of our everyday life, namely, that sometimes we 
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accept the speaker’s assertion without verification, and sometimes we accept 
it only after verification. Local reductionists claim that in everyday life, we 
accept the speaker’s assertion when our customs or past experiences guide 
us, when we are in a simple trust stage, or when the situation is exceptional. 
However, when we have reason for doubt in each of these cases (barring the 
exceptional case) or in cases other than those mentioned, we verify the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s assertion before accepting it. Contrariwise, 
according to anti-reductionism, when he/she has no reason to doubt the 
trustworthiness of the speaker’s assertion, he/she is entitled to accept it.  
I believe that both local reductionism and anti -reductionism 
ultimately make the same point. The differences depend on their different 
standpoints. They explain the same facts in two different manners, because 
they are looking at the same facts from different points of view. Local 
reductionists explain why we do not accept the assertions of some speaker 
(or in some context) without any verification and anti -reductionists explain 
why we do accept the assertions of some speaker without any verification. 
However, they are, in fact, supplementing each other.  
Jennifer Lackey attempts to balance these two views and presents a 
new theory of testimony known as dualism. She combines reductionism and 
anti-reductionism in the following manner:  
“For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows (believes with 
justification/warrant) that p on the basis of A’s testimony only if:  
(D1) B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony,  
(D2)  A’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive, 
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(D3)  B is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony,  
(D4) The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable 
for the reception of reliable testimony, 
(D5) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for 
A’s testimony, and 
(D6) B has appropriate positive reason for accepting A’s testimony.” 
(Lackey 2008, 177–178) 
Lackey, provides necessary conditions for testimony.
65
 However, I 
believe that these conditions face a serious problem, namely that we are 
forced to accept the speaker’s assertion even if some of those conditions are 
not satisfied. For example, suppose that a speaker S asserts that p to a hearer 
H, and H is not in a position to verify S’s assertion nor has any positive 
reason in favor of S’s assertion (in Chapter Two I gave the example of the 
officers of the space station who accept the assertion of officers belonging to 
the enemy country) but accepts that p. Now, if Lackey’s formulation is 
correct, then H does not gain any knowledge from S’s assertion because H 
has no appropriate positive reason in favor of S’s testimony (condition D6). 
Lackey is well aware of this type of objection. More precisely, she 
remarks that there are two objections against D6, namely the “scarcity of 
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 “….dualism specifies only necessary conditions, there may be other conditions 




information objection  (SIO)” and “circularity objection (CO)”. In my 
context only SIO is relevant and I will discuss it only. Lackey formulates 
SIO as follows: 
“Ordinary epistemic agents simply do not have enough 
information to acquire positive reasons strong enough to 
justify accepting most of the testimony intuitively justified 
or warranted (Lackey 2008, 180).”    
She remarks that this objection is irrelevant to her formulation of 
dualism because she is presenting “weaker conditions then that required by 
reductionists” (Lackey 2008, 181). By D6 she simply attempts to “ensure 
that the hearer’s acceptance of the testimony is rationally acceptable” 
(Lackey 2008, 181). 
Next, Lackey attempts to justify the role of the positive reasons for 
acceptance of testimony in absence of insufficient information about the 
speaker. According to Lackey, when the hearer does not haves any 
information about the speaker, then he/she can gain  a positive reasons for 
accepting speaker’s testimony on the basis of observation of the speaker’s 
behavior, context, type of report, and so forth, as I had explain in Chapter 
One in the context of how the hearer ascribes the trustworthiness of the 
unknown speaker’s testimony (Hume 2000, 85; Lackey 2008, 182–183).  
However, I believe that Lackey’s defense of dualism is not 
convincing. If we accept a positive reason (as condition D6), in any form, as 
a necessary condition of the testimony, then it could leads to global 
reductionism and will not be able to explain those cases in which the hearer 
is not in a position to gain any reason (even in a weaker sense), such as the 
simple trust stage and exceptional cases (where the hearer has insufficient 
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knowledge to judge the trustworthiness of the speaker or the undefeated 
defeater is absent). There are also some other problems. Let us concede to 
Lackey that D6 is a necessary condition for testimony. It follows that D2 and 
D5 become redundant for the following reason:  
First, suppose that a speaker S asserts that p to a hearer H. Now, if H 
has any positive reason in favor of S’s assertion that p, then H can gain the 
knowledge that S’s testimony is truth-conducive (D2). Therefore, there is no 
need to add D2 in the formulation of dualism in addition to D6. 
Second, when the hearer has reason to accept the speaker’s assertion, 
no question arises regarding the absence of an undefeated defeater (D5) 
because the absence of undefeated defeater is relevant when the hearer does 
not have any positive reason to accept speaker’s assertion. Anti -reductionists 
accept “undefeated defeater” condition  to accept speaker’s testimony when 
the hearer does not has any positive reason in favor  of speaker’s testimony. 
Therefore, when the hearer has sufficient positive reasons to accept 
speaker’s testimony, the “undefeated defeater” condition  is not required. 
Therefore, condition D5, which is the “undefeated defeater” condition, is 
redundant when the hearer has a positive reason in favor of the speaker’s 
testimony. 
Now, one may ask the following question: if there is an undefeated 
defeater which contradict the positive reason, what should the hearer do? For 
example, suppose that John tells me that next Friday is Peter’s birthday. 
Now, in the present circumstances, I have some positive reason to accept 
John’s testimony, e.g. John is well known to me and he never deceives me; I 
have no sign which indicates that he is lying. Therefore, according to 
aforementioned claim that D5 is redundant when there is a positive reason in 
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fover of speaker’s testimony, I am entitled to accept John’s testimony. 
However, if I have any undefeated defeater against John’s testimony, such as 
I saw Peter’s birth certificates which says that Peter’s birthday is not next 
Friday, then should I accept John’s assertion in spite that fact that I have 
some positive reasons to accept John’s testimony?  The answer should be 
negative. Therefore, we cannot say that D5 is redundant when the speaker 
has a positive reason in favor of speaker’s testimony (D6).  
My answer is that when I have an undefeated defeater to doubt John’s 
testimony then I am not entitled to accept it because undefeated defeater and 
positive reason cannot co-exist. When I have an undefeated defeater against 
John’s testimony, then I do not have any positive reason to accept his 
testimony. On the other hand, when I have a positive reason to accept John’s 
testimony, it follows that I do not have any reason (undefeated defea ter or 
simple defeater) to doubt John’s testimony. Therefore, when the hearer has a 
positive reason to accept speaker’s testimony (D6), then condition D5 is 
redundant.  
For the aforementioned reason, I do not accept Lackey’s dualism and 
would like to formulate an account of testimony where D5 and D6 are not 
necessary for every testimony. My account would be able to explain the 
exceptional cases and the cases of the simple trust stage. I name this account 
“Contextualism”. According to it: 
For every speaker S and hearer H, H knows (believes with 
justification) that p on the basis of S’s testimony only if 
following conditions are satisfies: 




(C2) H is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of 
testimony, and 
(C3) the environment in which H receives S’s testimony is 
suitable for the reception of reliable testimony, and 
(C4.1) H’s memory past experience guides him/her to accept 
that p, 
 or 
(C4.2) H’s situation is exceptional in that it compels him/her 
to accept S’s testimony (simple trust stage or 
developmental stage),  
or 
(C4.3) H has no undefeated defeater for S’s testimony and 
testimony is truth-conducive,  
or 
 (C4.4) H has empirically verified S’s testimony.  
Let me now explain the significance of my conditions. The first three 
conditions are necessary for testimony. So, the hearer would not able to gain 
any knowledge from the speaker’s testimony when any of those conditions is 
not satisfied. The other condition is a disjunctive condition. The disjunction 
is necessary and which disjunct holds depends on context, that is, they are 
required on the contextual basis. For example, suppose that John tells me 
that there is an apple in the dining table. Now, in the present circumstances, 
if I satisfy the first three conditions and memories of my past experience 
guide me, then I am legitimate to accept John’s testimony. However, 
sometimes our memories of that past experiences are not able to guide us, 
and we are not able to verify speaker’s testimony personally (in Chapter 
Two I gave the example of the officers of the space station who accept the 
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testimony of officers belonging to the enemy country, that means there is 
reason to doubt speaker’s testimony), then we accept speaker’s testimony 
without any additional ground, since this is a exceptional situation. 
Sometimes, in the normal situation, we accept speaker’s testimony in the 
absence of a positive reason, when the hearer has no undefeated defeater 
against speaker’s testimony. However, sometimes we accept speaker’s 
testimony only after verification. Therefore, I believe that conditions C4.1 to 
C4.4 are not necessary for the testimony at the same context. They are 
necessary for testimony in the contextual basis. Sometimes , C4.1 is 
necessary, when rest of the conditions (C4.2 to C4.4) are not necessary, and 
vice versa.  
Now, the question is what is new in my formulation that was absent in 
Lackey’s formulation? I did not add the absence of undefeated defeater 
condition (C4.3) and positive reason condition {I consider (C4.1) and (C4.4) 
as a positive reason condition. (C4.1) is based in past experience and (C4.4) 
is based on present experience} at the same time. Unlike Lackey, in my 
formulation the speaker needs either of the conditions. Furthermore, in the 
condition (C4.3), I combined the truth-conducive condition with the 
undefeated defeater condition because the hearer needs these two conditions 
in together when he/she has no positive reason for speaker’s testimony. 
Condition (C4.2) is represents those cases where the hearer is not in a 
position to verify the trustworthiness of the speaker’s testimony and judge 
whether or not there is any undefeated defeater present for the speaker’s 
testimony. I believe, conditions added in the aforementioned formulation of 
Contextualism are the minimal conditions. Other conditions may be added to 




A correct epistemology of testimony should stress the role of the 
circumstances. When the circumstances demand that the hearer accept the 
speaker’s testimony on the basis of positive reason, then the hearer should 
do so. By contrast, when the circumstances demand that the hearer should 
accept speaker’s testimony without any positive reason, then the hearer 
should accept the speaker’s testimony without any positive reason. This is 
why I name this theory as Contextualism. 
However, my formulation of testimony is not free from objections. In 
Chapter Five, I argued that the hearer does not satisfy truth condition of 
knowledge when he/she accept speaker’s testimony without any verification. 
Therefore, same charge is applicable in my formulation of testimony, when 
the hearer accepts speaker’s testimony without any verification. For 
example, suppose that John tells me that there is an apple in the dining table, 
despite the fact that he holds a justified true belief that there is no apple in 
the dining table. Now, in the present circumstances, if I accept John’s 
testimony on the basis of some positive reasons, such as, he is a good 
person, he never deceive me, there is no sing for doubting him, then I will 
fail to gain a true belief from John’s testimony. Therefore, we may conclude 
that there are many chances of error if we accept speaker’s testimony 
without any verification; hence, we are not able to satisfy truth condition of 
the knowledge.  
 To solve this problem, I differentiate testimonial beliefs from 
testimonial knowledge. When a speaker S assert that P to a hearer H, then 
sometimes H believes that P. However, sometimes H refuse to believes that 
P. For example, suppose that John tells me that there is a picture of unicorn 
in the bad room, after hearing John’s assertion I may believe what he tells 
me. However, if he tells me that there is a unicorn in the bad room, then, 
immediately, I refuse to believe what he tells. Therefore, we may conclude 
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that sometimes we believe what other persons are told us. However,  it is not 
clear that my belief that there is a picture of a unicorn is true or false. It is 
possible that there is no picture of unicorn in the bad room. Therefore, we 
may conclude that regardless of truth value of the speaker’s assertion, 
occasionally, we believe speaker’s assertion. When, we believe speaker’s 
assertion without verifying the truth value of the assertion, the belief is 
considered as mere testimonial belief not a testimonial knowledge. By 
contrast, when we are certain about the truth value of the testimonial belief 
only then we can consider that belief as testimonial knowledge. In 
aforementioned example, when I believe that there is a picture of unicorn in 
the bad room on the basis of John’s assertion without knowing the truth 
value of John’s assertion, the belief is a mere testimonial belief, instead of 
testimonial knowledge. When we become certain about the truth value of 
speaker’s assertion only then we obtain testimonial knowledge.  
Therefore, in my opinion, whenever we receive a testimony that p we 
may believe that p on the basis of memories of past experience, 
circumstantial evidence, or present situation may compel us to accept the 
testimony and act accordingly. However, unless we become certain about the 
truth value of that p, we cannot say that we know that p.  We may formulate 
the conditions for mere testimonial belief as follows: 
For every speaker S and hearer H, H obtains mere belief that 
p on the basis of S’s assertion that p only if:  
1. H believes that p on the basis of S’s assertion that p. 
2. H is reliable or properly functioning recipient of 
testimony. 
3. The environment in which H receives S’s testimony is 
suitable for the reception of reliable testimony.  
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4. H is not certain about the truth value of S’s assertion that 
p. 
5.1 Memories of H’s past experience guide him or her to 
accept S’s assertion that p. 
Or 
5.2 Situation wherein H receives S’s assertion is exception 
in that it compels him/her to accept S’s assertion that p.  
Or  
5.3 H has no undefeated defeater (psychological or 
normative) for S’s testimony that p.  
Or  
5.4 S’s testimony is truth-conductive. 
In the aforementioned formulation the hearer acquires only mere 
belief that p because he/she is a reliable and properly functioned recipient 
and he/she believes that p on the basis of S’s assertion in a suitable 
environment, he/she is not certain about the truth value of that p, present 
situation compels him/her to believes that p or he/she believes on the basis 
of circumstantial evidence, although, these circumstantial evidence do not 
ensure that p is true. Here, H fulfills only two conditions of JTB formulation 
of knowledge, that is, (a) belief condition and (b) justificatory condition. 
However, occasionally H satisfies only (a) belief condition, when he/she on 
other option to believes S’s assertion (as I discussed in the  context of 
astronaut’s testimony in Chapter Two). 
By contrast we may formulate the conditions for testimonial 
knowledge as follows: 
For every speaker S and hearer H, H knows that p on the 
basis of S’s assertion that p only if:  
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1. H believes that p on the basis of S’s assertion that p, and 
2. H is reliable or properly functioning recipient of 
testimony, and 
3. The environment in which H receives S’s testimony is 
suitable for the reception of reliable testimony, and 
4. H is certain about the truth value of S’s assertion that p 
and has sufficient ground for believes that p on the basis 
of S’s assertion that p. 
In the aforementioned formulation the hearer H know that p on the 
basis of S’s assertion that p because H is reliable and properly functioned 
recipient and he/she believes that p on the basis of S’s assertion in a suitable 
environment, he/she is not certain about the truth value of that p, he/she has 
a justification for believing that p. Here H fulfills all of three conditions 
such as (a) belief condition, (b) truth condition, and (c) justificatory 
condition of JTB formulation of knowledge.  
Therefore, in my opinion, it is a fact that we acquire testimonial 
beliefs from the speaker’s testimony. Some beliefs, among those testimonial 
beliefs, can be considered as testimonial knowledge depending on 
satisfaction of all the conditions of JTB formulation of knowledge; others 
are mere beliefs. However, I believe that my formulation is a minimal 
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